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RICHARD S. KAY*
Constituent Authorityt
The force of a constitution, like the force of all enacted law, de-
rives, in significant part, from the circumstances of its enactment.
Legal and political theory has long recognized the logical necessity of
a "constituent power." That recognition, however, tells us little about
what is necessary for the successful enactment of an enduring consti-
tution. Long-term acceptance of a constitution requires a continuing
regard for the process that brought it into being. There must be, that
is, recognition of the "constituent authority" of the constitution-mak-
ers. This paper is a consideration of the idea of "constituent authority"
drawing on a comparison of various constitutional systems.
What makes a constitution a constitution? The difficulty in an-
swering this question lies, at least in part, in the fact that
constitutions evoke political possibility as well as legal constraint.
The explanation for the force they exert, therefore, depends on the
political and social context in which they are observed and, critically,
on the moment when the inquiry is made.
By "constitution," I mean a constitution in the modem sense, an
identifiable text or set of texts containing rules at the highest level of
the formal legal hierarchy. I exclude, therefore, the "material consti-
tution," the total collection of rules, practices and values that
underlie a functioning legal-political system. That is the sense, for
example, in which we usually speak of the "British constitution."'
* Wallace Stevens Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. An earlier ver-
sion was presented at the conference on Constitution Making and Constitutional
Change: Prospects for Constitutional Change in Turkey, held on March 19-20, 2010 in
Ankara, Turkey. I am grateful to the sponsor of the Congress, the Union of Turkish
Bar Associations and to the principal organizer, Professor Ozan Ergil, for facilitating
my participation. The original paper will also be published in the forthcoming pro-
ceedings of the conference. I thank Richard Albert, Chimhne Keitner, Tokujin
Matsudaira, John McGinnis and Carol Weisbrod, for helpful comments on prior
drafts.
t DOI 10.5131/AJCL.2010.0027
1. See HANS KELSEN, THE GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE, 124-26 (Anders
Wedberg trans., 1945); ANTHONY W. BRADLEY & KEITH D. EwING, CONSTITUTIONAL
AND ADMNISTRATIVE LAw 4 (14th ed. 2007). It appears to be with respect to the crea-
tion of this kind of unenacted constitution that Theodor Schilling says a constituent
power acts "in the way customary law is formed; by developing a custom and a corre-
sponding opinio juris over time." Theodor Schilling, The Autonomy of the Community
Legal Order: An Analysis of Possible Foundations, 37 HARv. Iwr. L.J. 389, 396 (1996).
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That kind of constitution develops organically; it is not the product of
deliberate design. The modem sense of constitution, in contrast, the
"formal constitution," is an instance of positive law, a piece of legisla-
tion and, therefore, it is the artifact of a discrete decision by some
particular people at some particular time, of a "datable act of human
will."2
In the first section, I will sketch out the dimensions of what I call
constituent authority and attempt to distinguish it from the more fa-
miliar idea of "constituent power." In the next section, I will examine
the relationship between constituent authority and positive law.
More specifically, I want to emphasize how, notwithstanding possible
appearances, constituent authority cannot be legal authority. In the
third section, I will explicate some of the problems involved in defin-
ing the most widely accepted constituent authority, that of "the
people." In the short concluding section, I will draw on that discus-
sion to suggest that the identification of constituent authority is an
inherently time-bound phenomenon. It results from the interaction of
current values and the current perception of historical events.
Constituent authority, as I use that term in this essay, refers to
the things that a given people in a given time and place understand
as competent to make a binding constitution. As such, it is, defini-
tionally, an artifact of and generalization from actual practice and
experience. It is not and cannot be a Platonic concept, a "brooding
omnipresence in the sky."3 It follows that inferring its characteristics
requires a critical consideration of the way real constitutions have
been generated and the way they have been regarded in different ju-
risdictions in various places and at various times. The elucidation of
constituent authority is necessarily a comparative exercise. 4
The two kinds of constitutions need not be mutually exclusive. See CONSTITUTION ACT,
1982 s. 52(1), (2) (providing that the Constitution of Canada is "the supreme law of
the land" but defining it no further than to say that it "includes" certain specified
enactments). Nor is this distinction identical to that Carl Schmitt drew between "con-
stitution" and "constitutional law." For him, the more basic and more entrenched
'constitution" was still the result of a fundamental decision. CARL SCHMITI, CONSTITU-
TIONAL THEORY, 80 (Jeffrey Seitzer, trans., 2008).
2. Larry Alexander, Introduction in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FoUN-
DATIONS (Larry Alexander ed., 1998). See also Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional
Authorship, in id. at 64, 64 [hereinafter Michelman, Authorship].
3. Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 244 (1916) (Holmes, J.
dissenting).
4. This comparative examination is an attempt to identify "a network of overlap-
ping and crisscross resemblances" which need not correspond to "some explicit or even
fully discoverable set of rules and assumptions that give the tradition its character."
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONs 45 (1962).
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I. CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUENT AUTHORITY
A modem constitution, like any other instance of positive law,
must be associated with a law-maker.5 The term of art that has
emerged to describe this constitutional law-maker is the "constituent
power." Recognizing the existence of such a power, however, tells us
very little about the qualities that invest a group of human beings
with the practical capacity to specify a constitution and to make it
stick. That investigation calls for a further consideration, one focus-
ing on the presence or absence of the components of constitution-
making authority.
The very idea of a constitutional law-maker suggests two levels
of power-the "constituent" that makes the constitution and the "con-
stituted" that is made, directly or indirectly, by the constitution. This
commonplace observation earned the Abb6 Sieybs the reputation of
being the originator of the idea of "constituent power."6 So firm is this
association, that the idea is commonly expressed in the language he
used-as the pouvoir constituent. In fact, versions of the idea are
much older. Some were elaborated in the constitutionally turbulent
seventeenth century in England. Among the more notable statements
in this period was George Lawson's 1660 Politica Sacra et Civilis.
Lawson posited that all government was circumscribed by an original
act of consent by the "community civil," an entity that was in sus-
pense while civil government was in effect but stood ready to reassert
itself on the appropriate occasion.7 John Locke's version is better
known. Near the end of the Two Treatises, Locke wrote that "the peo-
ple are at liberty to provide for themselves, by erecting a new
legislative, differing from the other, by the change of persons, or
form, or both, as they shall find it most for their safety and good."8 It
was Locke's ideas that influenced those phrases in the American Dec-
laration of Independence referring to the right of the people "to
institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles
5. I am taking this relationship for granted in this essay. I thus will not discuss
the interesting but, I think, unsupportable idea that it is sometimes proper to under-
stand a legal text without reference to the intentional acts that brought it into being.
This idea has some currency in the academic debate on constitutional interpretation
in the United States. My views are set out in Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and
Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW U. L. REv. 703 (2009).
6. EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYPS, WHAT is THE THIRD ESTATE? 125-32 (M. Blondel
trans., S.E. Finer ed., 1964).
7. GEORGE LAWSON, POLITICA SACRA ET CrVILIs, 26-27, 57-58, 371-84 (London,
1660) (C. Condren ed., 1992).
8. JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, s. 220 (Charles L. Sherman ed.,
1937). On the constituent power in seventeenth century English political thought, see
Martin Loughlin, Constituent Power Subverted: From English Constitutional Argu-
ment to British Constitutional Practice, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM:
CONsTrTUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker
eds., 2007) [hereinafter THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM]. See also Andreas
Kalyvas, Popular Sovereignty, Democracy and the Constituent Power, 12 CONSTELLA-
TIONs 223 (2005).
20111 717
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their safety and happiness."9
When, in the 1780's, the American revolutionaries turned consti-
tution-makers, they invoked a well-developed theory of constituent
authority according to which the people's will was both anterior and
superior to every instance of positive law, not excluding any constitu-
tional text.10 This dictum was taken for granted in the debates
leading to the drafting and ratification of the federal Constitution of
1787-89. One of the serious questions engaging the participants in
that process was the illegality-under the previous constitution, the
Article of Confederation in effect from 1781-1789-of the constituent
process.1 The advocates of the new constitution did not so much ar-
gue the point as urge its irrelevance. The new regime was to be
approved by special conventions elected in each of the states. Those
conventions were understood to be surrogates for the people and,
therefore, they represented an authority superior to the existing con-
stitutional rules. No one expressed this idea more forcefully or
insistently than James Wilson of Pennsylvania, a delegate to the
Philadelphia Convention of 1787 and later a Justice of the United
States Supreme Court. Writing about the constituent authority in
1791, he said:
From [the people's] authority the constitution origi-
nates: for their safety and felicity it is established; in their
hands it is as clay in the hands of the potter; they have the
right to mould, to preserve, to improve, to refine, and to fin-
ish it as they please. If so; can it be doubted, that they have
the right likewise to change it?12
"As our constitutions are superior to our legislatures," he told the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention in November, 1787, "so the people
are superior to our constitutions."' 3 The approval of the people, wrote
James Madison in The Federalist Papers, would "blot out antecedent
errors and irregularities."' 4
It was exactly this logic that Sieybs employed in invoking the
constituent power of the "nation" in 1789. The nation, he wrote, "is
9. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2.
10. The development is carefully recounted in GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969). On the temporal priority of the Ameri-
can over French ideas of constituent power, see CLAUDE KLEIN, THIORIE ET PRATIQUE
DU POUVOIR CONsTITuANT 7-18 (1996).
11. Richard S. Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 CONST. CoMM. 57 (1987)
[hereinafter Kay, Illegality].
12. James Wilson, Lectures on Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 375
(James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896).
13. JONATHAN ELLIOT, 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 432 (2d ed. 1891).
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 40 at 253 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).
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the source and supreme master of positive law." It exists "indepen-
dently of any rule and any constitutional form."15 This idea was
promptly put to work in the National Assembly. When it was argued
that any new constitution would require the approval of the king,
Guy-Jean-Baptiste Target denounced the idea that "the constituent
power had to ask the permission of the constituted power."16
It follows that we can distinguish two kinds of political decision-
making: the everyday public decisions of the constituted powers and
the extraordinary decisions of the constituent power.' 7 The hallmark
of the first category is that it is exercised within an accepted set of
legal institutions and procedures. The hallmark of the second is ex-
actly its freedom from such institutions and procedures. It is, rather,
something undefined, unconstrained by anything but the facts of na-
ture and its own will. Sieyds did say the constituent power (the
nation) "owes its existence to natural law alone." But by this he
meant only to emphasize its immunity to positive law. It is, he de-
clared, "completely untrammeled by any procedure." "[Wihatever its
decisions, it cannot lose the right to alter them as soon as its interest
requires."' 8
As a result, the constituent power is often described in terms of
raw force, physical, psychological and emotional. While he used the
term in quite a different context, the sense of this characterization is
captured in Max Weber's opposition of "legal" to "charismatic" au-
thority. The lord-hero is respected not for the conformity of his
actions with pre-defined formal criteria but because of his personal
qualities, "magical abilities, revelations of heroism, power of the
mind and of speech."' 9 Likewise, the only thing that makes the con-
stituent power effective is its own nature, its own will and its own
actions. It is, in these descriptions, unpredictable, almost wild. Ulrich
Preuss emphasizes the "creative, unorganized and untamed power" of
revolution. 20 There is something ominous about these depictions of
15. SIEYtS, supra note 6 at 128, 131.
16. Quoted in Jon Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies,
2 J. CONST. L. 346, 370 (2000) [hereinafter Elster, Arguing].
17. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-10 (1991).
18. SIEYkS, supra note 6, at 127. "Constituent power always remains alien to law."
GEORGES BURDEAU, 4 TRAITE DES SCIENCES POLITIQUES 171 (1983) quoted in ANTONIO
NEGRI, INSURGENCIES: CONSTITUENT POWER AND THE MODERN STATE 1 (1999). But see
William E. Scheuerman, Revolutions and Constitutions: Hannah Arendt's Challenge
to Carl Schmitt, 10 CAN J. L. & JURIs. 141, 149-50 (1997) arguing that Sieybs thought
the constituent power was limited by natural law.
19. Max Weber, The Three Types of Legitimate Rule, 4 BERKELEY PUB. IN SOC.
INST. 1 (trans. Hans Gerth., 1958).
20. Ulrich Preuss, Constitutional Powermaking for the New Polity: Some Deliber-
ations on the Relations Between Constituent Power and the Constitution, 14 CARDOZO
L. REv. 639, 640 (1993) [hereinafter Preuss, Powermaking]. See also Ulrich Preuss,
The Roundtable Talks in the German Democratic Republic, 99 [hereinafter Preuss,
Roundtable], in THE ROUNDTABLE TALKS AND THE BREAKDOWN OF COMMUNISM (Jon
Elster ed., 1996) [hereinafter ROUNDTABLE TALKS] (describing a revolution as "a pe-
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an illimitable power rising up out of a "normative and legal void."2 1
Carl Schmitt declared that the constituent power "springs out of a
normative nothingness and from a concrete disorder."22 "[T]he para-
digm of constituent power," according to Antonio Negri, "is that of a
force that bursts apart, breaks, interrupts, unhinges any pre-existing
equilibrium and any possible continuity." 23 It is no wonder numerous
writers have seen the specter of totalitarianism in invocations of con-
stituent power,24 a prospect reinforced by its modem association with
Carl Schmitt.
The concept of constituent authority I propose to examine in this
paper is different from, or perhaps additional to, the constituent
power these writers were attempting to describe. It will require elab-
oration but, put briefly, I refer to the observed quality in a person or
persons that enables them to produce an effective positive law consti-
tution. I do not intend to consider what, in light of one or another
universal political morality, might be argued properly to invest a per-
son or persons with that capacity.25 In this essay, I am interested in
practical authority, the kind that actually does produce a constitution
that is regarded as binding for an extended period in the population
governed by the legal system that the constitution purports to con-
trol. The character of such authority cannot be explained fruitfully
simply by close study of the individuals, groups or institutions that
made a constitution, the procedures they followed and the choices
they made. An adequate description requires, as well, an examina-
tion of the social and political context in which the constituent
process occurred and in which the resulting constitution operates. We
need to know how the constitution-makers' identities, words and ac-
tions were, and continued to be, regarded in the relevant society in
particular places and at particular times.26
In this sense, constituent authority, like constituent power, is a
factual not a moral competence. "Authority," according to Weber,
riod of lawlessness" in which "legal and constitutional questions are being reduced to
questions of power.").
21. Kalyvas, supra note 8, at 223 (2005).
22. Quoted in id. at 227. See also SCHMIrr, supra note 1, at 131 ("So long as [the
people] exist at all their life force and energy is inexhaustible and always capable of
finding new forms of political existence."). On the problematic character of Schmitt's
life and jurisprudence, see LAw As POLITICS: CARL SCHMITTS CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM
(David Dyzenhaus ed., 1998). For a useful synthesis of his sometimes inconsistent
statements about the constituent power, see Jan Muller, Carl Schmitt and the Consti-
tution of Europe, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1777 (2000).
23. NEGRI, supra note 18, at 11.
24. See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 153-64 (1963) discussed in
Kalyvas, supra note 8, at 230-31, 234-35. See also Albert Soboul, Some Problems of the
Revolutionary State, 65 PAST & PRESENT 52, 55 (1974) (connecting the embrace of
Siey6s' idea of the constituent power and the rise of the Jacobin dictatorship).
25. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 CoLum. L. REV.
111 (2003).
26. See Michelman, Authorship, supra note 2, at 67. See generally Part IV infra.
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"means the probability that specific command will be obeyed." 27 It
exists, as H.L.A. Hart said of the rule of recognition, "only as a com-
plex, but normally concordant, practice of the courts, officials and
private persons."28 As we have seen, the classic invocations of "con-
stituent power" stress that it requires no justification, legal or moral.
"Every attribute of the nation," said Sieybs, "springs from the simple
fact that it exists,"29 and Schmitt said that the will of the "constitu-
tion-making power is existentially present: its power or authority lies
in its being."30
This cannot be the whole story. There is always a reason why an
attempted assertion of power is effective. Rules might, for some time,
prevail solely because of the physical might the rule-maker can bring
to bear on the addressees of its rules. But for a successful constitution
to endure for an extended period, there must be something about it
that persuades (or at least permits) its subjects to submit to it. Such a
"reflective critical attitude," moreover, will always derive, at least in
part, from some regard for the circumstances of its creation.31 In the
case of a constitution, it will be essential that there exists an explicit
or implicit determination by some significant part of the population
that the makers of the constitution are or were an appropriate source
of constitutional rules.32 I use the term "authority" to underline the
fact that successful constitution-making must involve something
more than the expression of will. It calls for the "augmentation and
confirmation of will by some sort of reasoning."33 Authority involves
an evaluation of the rightness of the constituent events. In this way,
it incorporates what may properly be called moral reasons. 34 This
27. Weber, supra note 19, at 1.
28. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 110 (2d ed. 1994). For a recent elabora-
tion, see Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Obligations and the Internal Aspect of Rules, 75
FoRDHAM L. REv.1229 (2007).
29. SIEYts, supra note 6 at 126 . See also id. ("The national will .. . never needs
anything but its own existence to be legal."). See NEGRI, supra note 18, at 5 ("Whereas
the order of the constituted power is that of the Sollen (what ought to be) the order of
the constituent power is that of the Sein (what is).").
30. SCHMITT, supra note 1, at 64.
31. HART, supra note 28, at 57. As I will discuss further below, the effectiveness of
a constitution depends on two critical factors, the acceptability of its content and the
authority of its makers. I am mainly concerned in this paper with the latter although,
as I will discuss, the two are not perfectly separate. See Richard S. Kay, Constitu-
tional Chrononomy, 13 RATIO JuRIs 31 (2000) [hereinafter, Kay, Chrononomy].
32. On the complicated symbiotic relationship of constitutional legitimacy, politi-
cal effectiveness, and social stability, see SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN:
THE SoCIAL BASES OF POLITICs 64-70 (1960).
33. Carl J. Friedrich, Authority, Reason and Discretion, in AUTHORITY (NoMos
VOL. I) 28, 32 (Carl Friedrich ed., 1958).
34. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Rules of Recognition, Constitu-
tional Controversies, and the Dizzying Dependence of Law on Acceptance, in THE RULE
OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONsTITurION 175, 177-80 (Matthew Adler & Kenneth
Himma eds., 2009) See also Michelman, Authorship, supra note 2, at 73 ("[Flull
knowledge of a social practice includes knowledge of how participants in the practice
experience it, 'from the inside' so to speak . . .").
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does not make its existence any less a fact but it is a certain kind of
fact, one that includes the collective critical judgments of some num-
ber of individuals in certain times and places. It is this continuing
normative attitude that distinguishes constituent authority from
simple constituent power.
This is why an inquiry into the character of constituent authority
in any particular legal system obliges us to know something about
the social, political and moral values shared in the population that
the constitution is supposed to govern at the time that it is supposed
to govern. Still, as the expositors of constituent power recognized, we
need to think of those values apart from the requirements of the le-
gality that the constitution in question brings into being. An
indispensable attribute of the constituent authority is its "exterior-
ity" to the constitutional system it establishes.35 In the constitutional
debates in late eighteenth-century America, it was common to refer
to popular opinion and interest as things existing apart from the le-
gal institutions of government. This was the "people at large" or,
more suggestively, the "people out-of-doors," who expressed them-
selves outside of the ordinary devices of representation. 3 6 Whatever
else it is, the authority that makes constitutions will always be out-
of-doors.
II. LEGAL CONSTITUENT AUTHORITY
In 1981, the Canadian Ministry of Justice published a defense of
the government's proposal for a fundamental change in the country's
constitution, including the enactment of a Charter of Rights and the
creation of a new procedure for constitutional amendment. "Canadi-
ans take pride," it said, "in the fact that our Constitution, unlike
those of many nations, is entirely lawful both in its origins and its
subsequent development."3 7 The idea that a constitution might be
"lawful . . . in its origins" is directly contrary the exteriority of the
constituent authority just discussed. But the position of the Canadian
government is far from unique. Constitution-making is often, per-
haps usually, conducted under the claimed authority of positive law.
The creation of constitutions in former British colonies like Ca-
nada certainly seems to confirm that description. The constitution of
Antigua and Barbuda, for example, in force now for almost thirty
years, was promulgated by Queen Elizabeth II of the United King-
dom on July 31, 1981 as a schedule to an Order-in-Council, citing "the
powers vested in Her in that behalf by section 5(4) of the West Indies
35. See Lucien Jaume, The Constituent Power in France: The Revolution and its
Consequences, in THE PAIRDOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 8, 67-68.
36. See WOOD, supra note 10, at 319-28.
37. JEAN CHReTIEN, THE ROLE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM IN THE AMENDMENT OF
THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION 5 (1981).
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Act 1967."38 A more elaborate chain of legality is involved in the crea-
tion of the current Constitution of Sri Lanka. It was adopted in 1978
by the National State Assembly pursuant section 51 of the Constitu-
tion of Sri Lanka of 1972. That section specified a procedure
requiring a two-thirds majority of the whole membership of the As-
sembly for any bill "for the replacement, repeal or amendment of the
Constitution."3 9 That 1972 Constitution, giving the country a republi-
can form of government and a new name, had itself been adopted by a
two-thirds vote of the Parliament of Ceylon after an election in which
the manifesto of the victorious party had sought the "mandate of the
people to permit the members of Parliament they elect to function
simultaneously as a Constituent Assembly." 40 Once elected, however,
the 1972 parliament acted explicitly under section 29 of the Ceylon
(Constitution) Order-in-Council (1946) invoking that earlier constitu-
tion's rules for its own amendment by the Ceylon Parliament. The
1946 Order-in-Council, like that of Antigua and Barbuda, drew legal
effect from an act of the United Kingdom Parliament.41
In each of these cases-and many more examples could be
cited-the jurisdiction in question either put into place a wholly new
governing instrument or made such far reaching changes to existing
documents that it is reasonable to say that the very basis of law and
state had been altered. We are dealing, that is, with more than mere
constitutional amendment. It is, admittedly, impossible to draw a
precise line between amendment and replacement and the proce-
dures established for the former are sometimes employed in effecting
the latter. The enactments of the new Sri Lankan constitutions in
1972 and 1978 are examples. In a much-noted judgment, the Hun-
garian Constitutional Court declared that the 1989 "amendments" to
the Communist Constitution of 1949 "conferred on the state, its law
and the political system a new quality, fundamentally different from
that of the previous regime" and, therefore, they "gave rise to a new
Constitution."42 Michel Rosenfeld notes that "since 1989 every sec-
tion of the Hungarian Constitution has been changed except for the
38. The Antigua and Barbuda Constitutional Order, 1981. By its own terms, the
Order and the Constitution did not come into force until October 31, 1981. On Orders-
in-Council, see BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 1, at 680-81.
39. Constitution of Sri Lanka (1972), s. 51.
40. Quoted in W.A. Wiswa Warnapala, Sri Lanka in 1972:Tension and Change,
13 ASIA SURVEY 217, 219 (1973).
41. The Independence Constitution of Ceylon was put into effect in a series of
procedural steps evidenced in a number of different instruments. The ultimate vali-
dating enactment was the Ceylon Independence Act, 1947. See IvoR JENNINGS, THE
CONsTrrrION OF CEYLON 3-16 (1949).
42. Resolution No. 11/1992 (111.5) AB, 1 J. CONsT. L. IN E. & CENT. EuR. 129,134
(1994). See Andrew Arato, Dilemmas Arising from the Power to Create Constitutions
in Eastern Europe, 14 CARDOzo L. REv. 661, 676 (1994). See generally Peter Paczolay,
Constitutional Transition and Legal Continuity, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 559 (1993).
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section which specifies that Budapest is the capital."43 Yet the Con-
stitution is still presented on the website of the Hungarian
Constitutional Court with the title, "The Constitution of the Republic
of Hungary (Act XX of 1949 as revised and restated by Act XXXI of
198944)." The idea, however, that any and every constitutional
change can be accomplished by virtue of an authority that is itself
created by a constitution has been increasingly doubted. The most
prominent expression of this distinction is probably the Indian Su-
preme Court's judgment in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of
Kerala,45 holding that the constitutional amendment power did not
extend to alterations of certain basic features of the constitution. The
amending authority, as explained in a subsequent judgment, creates
no right "to destroy the identity of the Constitution."4 6 The character
of this reasoning is highlighted by distinguishing the Indian Court's
decision in Kesavananda Bharati from that in an earlier case. In Go-
lak Nath v. State of Punjab, the Court had also held a procedurally
perfect amendment to the Constitution invalid. In Golak Nath, how-
ever, the analysis turned on the particular language of the existing
constitution. The majority in the earlier case relied on the facts that
1) Article 13 prohibited the making of "any law" abridging guaran-
teed individual rights, and 2) an amendment to the Constitution, a
parliamentary act, was a "law" subject to the limitations of Article 13.
When, predictably, Parliament amended Article 13 to exclude consti-
tutional amendments from the category of laws so limited, the
Supreme Court was obliged to address the issue in more general
terms.47
There are few instances of courts following the precedent of
Kesavananda Bharati in inferring limitations on the amendment
power from the inherent characteristics of authorized constitutional
change. 48 On the contrary, there are at least some courts that have
expressly rejected it." But the core notion on which the judgment
43. MICHEL ROSENFELD, THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUBJECT: SELF-
HOOD, CITIZENSHIP, CULTURE AND COMMUNITY 31 (2010).
44. Http://www.mkab.hu/index.php?id=constitution.
45. A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461.
46. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789, quoted in Richard
Albert, Nonconstitutional Amendments 22 CAN. J. OF L. & JuRis. 5, 24 (2009).
47. These cases are summarized and criticized in KEMAL GOZLER, JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: COMPARATIVE STUDY 66-78, 88-99 (2008).
48. See Anwar Hossain Chowdhary v. Bangladesh, 1989 BLD (AD)(Spl) 1; Al-Je-
had Trust v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1996 SC 324 (both discussed in Anuranjan
Sethi, Basic Structure Doctrine: Some Reflections at 34-35 (Oct. 25, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=835165); Loh Kooi Choon v. Government of Malaysia, 1997 2
M.L.J. 187.
49. E.g., In re The 13th amendment to the Constitution, [19871 2 SRI LANKA L. R.
312. The United States Supreme Court summarily rejected a substantially similar
argument in 1922. Leser v. Garnet, 258 U.S. 130 (1922). See also Re Article 26 and the
Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State Termination of Pregnancies)
Bill 1995 1 I.R. 1.
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was based-that there is something wrong with the idea that an
"amendment" might alter the essential character of a constitution
while simultaneously invoking its authority-has been embraced by
many modern constitution-makers. It finds expression in numerous
provisions withdrawing certain subjects from the power of amend-
ment.50 The distinction was presaged by Schmitt in his dictum that
amendments may change "constitutional laws" but not "the constitu-
tion."5 The distinction is fundamental. Abraham Lincoln contested
Southern arguments that states had a constitutional right to secede
from the United States, insisting that no government "ever had a pro-
vision in its organic law for its own termination." Such a revolution
could only be effected by "some action not provided for in the instru-
ment itself."52 Andrew Jackson had earlier agreed that "[slecession,
like any other revolutionary act, may be morally justified by the ex-
tremity of oppression; but to call it a constitutional right, is
confounding the meaning of terms."53
Recognition of the difference between change within a subsisting
constitution and the creation of a new constitution, however, has not
prevented invocation of positive law in effecting even the latter. We
have already noted the employment of the procedures of constitu-
tional amendment to effect a thorough replacement of the
constitution. Constitution-makers, moreover, sometimes attempt not
only to write a constitution and specify the means of modifying it but
also to control, in explicit terms, the circumstances in which the con-
stitution is abandoned and a new one created. While its intended
scope is not perfectly clear, this appears to be what the drafters of
Article V of the United States Constitution intended in providing for
the possibility, under certain circumstances, of a national constitu-
tional convention. A convention specially elected for, and specially
focused on, constitutional revision was understood as uniquely com-
petent to represent the sovereign people and its very irregularity, its
independence from existing state law, was felt to enhance its qualifi-
50. See, e.g., Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 1982, arts. 2-4 (making cer-
tain features of the constitutional state irrevocable including, inter alia its
"democratic, secular and social" character). For other examples, see GOZLER, supra
note 47, at 52-68; EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE
COMMISSION), REPORT ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, 41-42 CDL-AD(2010)001 at
12-13 (Jan. 19, 2010) [hereinafter VENICE COMMISSION REPORT]. A recent comparative
critical review of such provisions is Albert, supra note 46. See also the perceptive
discussion in KLEIN, supra note 10, at 173-85.
51. SCHMrTr, supra note 1, at 79 ("The German Reich cannot be transformed into
an absolute monarchy or into a Soviet republic through a two-thirds majority decision
of the Reichstag.").
52. 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 385 (Henry Commager ed., 1948).
53. Id. at 266. The claim of a legal right to change the jurisdictional reach of a
constitutional regime might arise more naturally-though not, therefore, un-
problematically-in those constitutions in which such a right is explicit. See
Constitution of St. Christopher and Nevis, s. 113; Constitution of the Federal Demo-
cratic Constitution of Ethiopia, 1995, art. 39.
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cations to do so. 5 4 By making provision for it in the Constitution itself
(similar devices were written into state constitutions5 5 ), the constitu-
tion-makers attempted to have it both ways. Similarly, Sieybs and
Condorcet both (unsuccessfully) urged the National Assembly of 1789
to incorporate explicit machinery for periodic constitutional revi-
sion.56 More recent constitutions also sometimes prescribe
procedures for both their amendment and their replacement. Article
30 of the Argentine Constitution establishes a single procedure ex-
pressly declared to be competent to reform the whole constitution or
any of its parts.57 The Nicaraguan Constitution of 2007 provides dis-
tinct procedures for "partial" and "total" reform of the Constitution,
the latter requiring the additional approval of a specially elected
"Constituent National Assembly."58 Perhaps surprisingly, the Swiss
Constitution provides more avenues for a total than for a partial revi-
sion.5 9 The ambiguity attached to such textual authority is captured
in the term sometimes used to describe it, a pouvoir constituent
deriV. 60
In this connection, Article 146 of the German Basic Law deserves
special mention. In that provision, the Basic Law, consistent with its
54. See WOOD, supra note 10, at 306-43.
55. Kermit L. Hall, The Irony of the Federal Constitution's Genius: State Constitu-
tional Development, in THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
235-61, 241 (Peter F. Nardulli ed., 1992).
56. Jaume, supra note 35, at 70-71.
57. Constituci6n de la Nacion Argentina, art. 30 (Aug. 22, 1994). See also Consti-
tution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Chapter XII (providing
parallel procedures for the "amendment of any provision of the Constitution" and for
the "repeal and replacement of the Constitution"); Constitution of the Republic of Bul-
garia, art. 158 (1991) (providing that a "new constitution" might be adopted by a
"Grand National Assembly").
58. Constituci6n Politica de la Repiblic de Nicaragua, arts. 191-95 (Feb. 2007).
See also art. 168 of the Spanish Constitution of 1979 requiring a plan for "total revi-
sion" to be passed by two-thirds of the members of each house of the legislature and
that a resulting new text be approved by the same majorities after a new election and
confirmed by a referendum. The case law of the Austrian Constitutional Court distin-
guishing revisions requiring referenda from amendments that may be effected by
Parliament is discussed in GOZLER, supra note 47, at 34-40. The Philippine constitu-
tion, in contrast, authorizes amendment but not revision by popular initiative.
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1987 art. XVII. The Philippine Su-
preme Court elaborated the distinction in Lambrino v. Comm'n on Elections, G.R. No.
174153. Several American state constitutions allow constitutional amendments but
not revisions to be proposed by popular initiative. See, e.g., California Constitution,
art. XVIII. In this case, however, the different treatment may be motivated more by
practical considerations than notions of legitimate political authority. The distinction
may be based on a supposition that there is no way "the people" can formulate a com-
plicated new constitutional scheme. In this respect the limitation is related to the
common rule that referendum proposals be limited to a "single subject." See William
B. Fisch, Constitutional Referendum in the United States of America 54 AM. J. COmP.
L. 485, 499-504 (Supp. 2006).
59. Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, arts. 193-95 (Apr. 18, 1999).
60. The same term is also used in connection with the power of constitutional
amendment; see Michel Lascombe, LE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL DE LA V REPUBLIQUE
331-37 (9th ed. 2005).
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enactors' understanding that it was a mere provisional constitution
pending eventual German unification, "contemplated its own termi-
nation."6 1 It states that "this Basic Law will lose its validity on the
effective date of a constitution that has been chosen by the German
people in a free decision."62 The text is silent both as to the definition
of the "German people" and the manner in which it might manifest
its "free decision." The limited force of this kind of provision is demon-
strated by the fact that, at the moment of unification, the powers-
that-were, prominently including the holders of power conferred by
the Basic Law, refused to invoke it. They chose instead to amend the
Basic Law and leave it, so amended, in place over the now enlarged
territory and population.63 Significantly, however, Article 146 was re-
tained in the Basic Law after unification. It is unclear how the
constituent authority that it recognizes fits with Article 79 stipulat-
ing the process of constitutional amendment. It has been suggested
that, like the ordinary amending authority, the "free decision" of the
German people could not extend to alteration of the unamendable as-
pects of the Basic Law referred to in Article 79(3).64 It says something
about the nature of provisions like these that one astute commenta-
tor has assumed that these questions would have to be resolved by
the Constitutional Court, itself of course, a creature of the Basic
Law.65
For the reasons suggested in the previous section, these at-
tempted constitutionalizations of the constituent authority are
deeply paradoxical. Recognition of the constituent authority necessa-
rily presupposes something superior to all positive law that cannot
logically be provided for by law. When James Madison offered a draft
of the Bill of Rights in the first United States Congress in 1789, its
first provision (rejected by Congress) would have inserted a state-
ment at the beginning of the constitutional text, declaring "that the
people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to re-
form or change their government, whenever it be found adverse or
inadequate to the purposes of its institution."66 Numerous state con-
stitutions of the period did incorporate such a principle.67 Among the
additions to the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen
61. PETER QUINT, THE IMPERFECT UNION: CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES OF GER-
MAN UNIFICATION 49 (1997).
62. Quoted in id.
63. See id. at 50-51.
64. See Christoph Mollers, "We (are afraid of) the People:" Constituent Power in
German Constitutionalism, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 8, at
87, 96-98.
65. See QUINT, supra note 61, at 54-55.
66. 1 Annals of Congress 451(House of Representatives, First Congress, First
Session).
67. See, e.g. Constitution of Kentucky, 1792, art. 12(12); Constitution of New
Hampshire, 1792, art. X; Constitution of Pennsylvania, 1790. art. IX (2).
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adopted by the National Convention in 1793 was the proposition that
"[a] people has always the right to review, to reform, and to alter its
constitution. One generation cannot subject to its law the future
generations." 68
Like Article 146 of the Basic Law, such constitutional statements
of principle typically made no attempt to define or even identify the
"people" possessing such a right. Much less did they seek to impose
substantive or procedural limits on their exercise of that right. They
might, therefore, be dismissed as rhetorical decoration. When a new
exercise in constitution-making is actually undertaken, its uneasy re-
lationship with positive law is often apparent. There is no better
example than the 1787 Philadelphia Convention that drafted the
United States Constitution. It had been called into being by a sum-
mons from the Continental Congress, meeting under the Articles of
Confederation, for "the sole and express purpose of revising the Arti-
cles of Confederation and reporting to Congress and the several
legislatures." It was to do nothing but make proposals which were
then to be "agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states."69
When it grossly exceeded that charge, proposing a new constitution
and by-passing the Congress and state legislatures, we have already
seen that its actions were defended by reliance on the ultimate au-
thority of the "people." The positive law of the Articles, it was pointed
out, did not and could not speak to the rights of that constituent au-
thority. Legal objections to the constituent process, one delegate said,
"erroneously suppose that we are proceeding on the basis of the Con-
federation. This convention is unknown to the Confederation."70
The efficacy of attempts to define and control the constituent au-
thority with rules of positive law has sometimes been tested in
connection with the actions of constitutional conventions in the
American states. The experience in Pennsylvania in 1872 illustrates
the deep ambiguity at the heart of this question. The Constitution of
1838 provided for amendments to be passed by two consecutive legis-
latures and approved by popular vote. No provision was made for a
constitutional convention. Nevertheless, in June 1871, the legislature
submitted a question on the calling of a constitutional convention to a
referendum. That proposition was approved by the voters and further
legislation the next year provided the machinery for electing and con-
vening the convention. That body met and drafted a new
constitution. It then passed an ordinance for the organization of an
election at which the draft constitution would be put to a vote. The
procedures specified appeared, in some respects, to be contrary to the
68. Art. 28.
69. 3 MAx FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 13-14
(1911). See generally Kay, Illegality, supra note 11.
70. 2 FARRAND, supra note 69, at 51.
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convention's enabling legislation (not to mention the existing consti-
tution) in several ways. Two suits were brought seeking to enjoin the
referendum which state officials had been prepared to hold on the
convention's terms. One of these suits was dismissed in the trial
court in a remarkable opinion by Judge Edwin H. Stowe. Citing the
state constitution's Declaration of Rights that recognized the people's
"inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform or abolish their
government in such manner as they think proper," he affirmed that
"such power exists above and before the constitution." The right to
remake the constitution exists "in all cases and at all times, whether
there is a way provided in their constitution or not." This right, once
revolutionary, had now been "restrained and modified." It could be
exercised by "the introduction of constitutional and legal revolution
by the consent of the constituted authorities of the state." The con-
vention, "quasi-revolutionary in its character, [has] absolute power,
so far as necessary to carry out the purpose for which [it was] called
into existence ... [W]hen once called into operation by proper author-
ity, it cannot be subverted nor restrained by the legislature."7 '
This was a view of things that horrified the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. In its opinion in the second suit, one that had been
filed directly in the Supreme Court, it held the convention had no
right to exceed the mandate set for it by the legislature that had
called it into being. To recognize a broader power was not in any way
a vindication of the constituent authority of the people recognized in
the Declaration of Rights. The delegates to the convention were
elected and assembled for the limited purpose expressed in the ena-
bling legislation. It was only that legislation which was entitled to
claim popular sanction. The convention was "the off-spring of law. It
had no other source of existence." To give effect to the unauthorized
actions of the convention would, in fact, deprive the people of the
right, exercised in the appropriate legislation, to make their own de-
cisions. The defendant officials were, therefore, enjoined from holding
the referendum according to the rules prescribed in the convention's
ordinance. 72 When Judge Stowe's decision came before the Supreme
Court some time later, it took pains to disassociate itself from his
"unsound and dangerous" views. The facts presented did not raise the
question of "the power of the legislature to restrain the people," but
"the right of the people by the instrumentality of law to limit their
delegates." "Law is the highest act of a people's sovereignty while
their government and constitution remain unchanged." The conven-
tion could not rise above its legal source.73
71. Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. 59, 1874 Pa. LEXIS 35, at 8-10, 21-22 (1874).
72. Wells v. Bain, 79 Pa. 39, 48 1873 Pa. LEXIS 162, 22.
73. Wood's Appeal, supra note 71, at 69-72, 25-35.
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But the events themselves muddied this neat priority of legisla-
tion and constituent authority. In neither of its judgments did the
Supreme Court question the constitutionality of the legislation creat-
ing the convention nor the potential for its acts, after popular
ratification, to replace the previous constitution. It reached these con-
clusions even though the existing constitution had provided what
appeared to be an exclusive method of constitutional change, a
method which had been entirely disregarded in the process under
consideration. In a paradoxical argument, the court acknowledged
that the convention procedure was a way of expressing the original
will of the sovereign people-something outside the positive law rules
of the constitution-but that procedure was cognizable as such only
because it was authorized by the positive law of the enabling legisla-
tion.74 More strikingly, by the time the Supreme Court was able to
issue its judgment in the appeal from Judge Stowe's decision, the con-
vention's draft had already been approved in the referendum and
had, in most respects, been in force for almost a year. The Court did
nothing to cast doubt on the validity of that adoption. Before launch-
ing its peroration on the limited powers of the convention, it conceded
that "[t]he change made by the people in their political institutions,
by the adoption of the proposed Constitution since the [issuance of
the] decree [appealed from] forbids an inquiry into the merits of this
case. The question is no longer judicial ... ."75
The dual character of constitution-making bodies called into be-
ing by the legal institutions of an existing regime has been a
persistent theme in debates concerning constituent authority. Jon El-
ster noted in connection with the Philadelphia Constitutional
Convention of 1787 and the French National Assembly of 1789 that
"[t]he tension between the assemblies and their conveners-between
the creature and creator-was at the heart of both processes."76 For
Siey~s, there were obvious problems in locating the constituent au-
thority of the "nation" in individuals chosen to participate in the old
"constituted" machinery of the Estates-General. But the election and
convocation of that body-occurring for the first time in 175 years-
was truly extraordinary. The financial crisis that generated its meet-
ing had been universally understood as centering on the fundamental
political structure of the kingdom and the cahiers drafted to instruct
74. Wells v. Bain, supra note 68, at 47-48.
75. Wood's Appeal, supra note 71, at 68-69, 24-25. See also Armstrong v. King,
281 Pa. 207, 222-23, 126 A. 263, 268 (1924) ("[The approval by the people gives unat-
tackable validity to the Constitution or amendment submitted to them."). On the
American case law of challenges to constitutional conventions and referenda, see
JOHN A. JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THEIR HISTORY
POWERS AND MODES OF PROCEEDING (1887); ROGER S. HOAR, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TIONS: THEIR NATURE, POWERS AND LIMITATIONS (1917).
76. Jon Elster, Constitutional Bootstrapping in Philadelphia and Paris, 14 CAR-
Dozo L. REV. 549, 559 (1994) [hereinafter Elster, Bootstrapping].
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the delegates, especially those of the Third Estate, anticipated a new
constitutional settlement.77 In these circumstances, the self-transfor-
mation of the augmented Third Estate in June 1789 to a National
Assembly and, then, to a Constituent Assembly was, if not inevitable,
at least understandable. In fact, in What is the Third Estate?, Sieybs
had foreseen the capacity of extraordinary representatives who could
act for the nation "[w]hatever the manner in which they were ap-
pointed as deputies."78 The convening of any constituent authority,
after all, is the expression of a belief that the existing constituted
powers are so defective as to require replacement.79 In these circum-
stances-and armed with the legitimacy of popular selection in a
time of crisis-the temptations presented to such a body to break free
of mere legal constraints must be considerable. In the New York Con-
stitutional Convention of 1821, one delegate responded this way to an
argument that the convention had to act within limits imposed by
positive law: "No restriction limits our proceedings . . . Sir, we are
standing upon the foundations of society. The elements of govern-
ment are scattered around us."80
Sometimes, of course, an assembly convenes under the law of an
existing constitution, regards itself as the agent of that constitution,
acts according to its procedures and restricts its changes so as to re-
main within limits authorized by positive law. This has, in fact, been
the more common course in the many constitutional conventions that
have been held in American states. In contrast to the experience in
Pennsylvania, such constitutional changes have, on occasion, been
successfully challenged in state courts and then reformed to comply
with the adverse judicial decision.8' Recently the Philippine Supreme
Court successfully blocked a referendum on a major alteration to the
Constitution (changing inter alia, the presidential system to a parlia-
mentary one) because the existing constitutional text limited the use
of initiative to proposals for "amendments" and requiring that more
extensive constitutional revisions be approved by a constitutional
convention. 82
77. See TIMOTHY TACKETI', BECOMING A REVOLUTIONARY: THE DEPUTIES OF THE
FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE EMERGENCE OF A REVOLUTIONARY CULTURE 77-
116 (1996); CHIMtNE KEITNER, THE PARADOXES OF NATIONALISM: THE FRENCH
REVOLOUTION AND ITS MEANING FOR CONTEMPORARY NATION-BULIDING 55-63 (2007).
78. SIEYts, supra note 6, at 131. He hoped that the product of the Assembly might
be provisional pending the approval of a more appropriate constitution-making body.
See Jaume, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 8, at 69-70.
79. See Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process,
45 DuKE L.J. 364, 375 (1995) [hereinafter Elster, Forces].
80. Quoted in JAMESON, supra note 75, at 303.
81. See, e.g., State ex rel Kvaalen v. Graybill, 159 Mont. 190.496 P.2d 1127 (1972)
(holding a state constitutional convention could not delegate its educational functions
to a committee and rejecting a claim that the convention had "plenary" authority).
82. Lambrino v. Comm'n on Elections, G.R. No. 174153 (Oct. 25, 2006). The
court's action in this case may be contrasted with its prior judgments recognizing the
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In the final analysis, however, given the definitions with which
we are working, the exercise of genuine constituent authority can
never be identified by its relation to legal form. "Like every other or-
der, the legal order rests on a decision and not on a norm."a* To
inquire into the authority to make a new constitution is exactly to ask
who may establish law without legal sanction. This is merely the
other side of the juridical learning about the limits of the power of
constitutional amendment canvassed above. If, as the Supreme Court
of India said, it is impossible for an amendment "to destroy the iden-
tity of the Constitution,"84 it follows that an action that does destroy
a constitution's identity and effectively establishes a new one
amounts to a fresh exercise of constituent authority. The creation of a
new constitution-as opposed to the modification of a continuing con-
stitution-is always, in significant part, an act of negation.85 The
critical variable is the quality of the change. Has that change altered
the "identity" of the legal system so that the chain of reasoning about
the validity of a legal act can no longer plausibly work back to the
prior constitution? Constitution-making, according to Michel Rosen-
feld, "requires both negation of pre-constitutional identities and
creation of a new identity, which call for reincorporation of material
from the pre-constitutional past."86 When we are able to say that the
underlying sanction for all lawmaking (the rule of recognition) has
successfully changed, it is proper to say that the agent of that change
has exercised constituent authority.
Consequently, when the constitution of Antigua and Barbuda, al-
ready mentioned as an example of apparent legal enactment of a
constitution, went into effect in 1981, it marked the full emergence of
a constitutional system premised on a new set of political institutions
as well as the excision of any rights of government in persons or orga-
nizations in the United Kingdom. It was the culmination of a process
in which the participants included the local government under Brit-
ish colonial authority, a constitutional committee that received and
collated public responses to a draft constitution and a special consti-
tutional conference held in 1980 that included delegations from
Antiguan political parties, regional associations as well as the United
effectiveness of extra-legal constitutional change attributable to a decision of "the peo-
ple." Javellana v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. L-36142 (Mar. 31, 1973); Saturnino v.
Bermudez, G.R. No. 76180 (Oct. 24, 1986).
83. CARL ScHmrr, POLITCAL THEOLOGY: FouR CHAPrERs ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNrY 10 (George Schwab trans., 2005).
84. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789, quoted in Albert,
supra note 46, at 24.
85. See ROSENFELD, supra note 43, at 46-51.
86. Id. at 186. By pre-constitutional, Rosenfeld means certain features in the his-
tory of the people for whom the new constitution is made. It might, I think, be usefully
understood in a logical as well as historical sense, as a reference to the social and
political conditions for any kind of law-making.
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Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The Antigua and Bar-
buda parliament approved the text of a constitution that was then
promulgated by the Queen in London as an Order-in-Council.87 In
this case, an investigation of the paper trail reveals no illegal step but
it would be formal in the extreme to say the Antigua and Barbuda
Constitution actually derives it force from regard for the authority of
the Queen-in-Council, acting pursuant to an act of the United King-
dom Parliament. Specifying the decisions that really gave the force of
law to the constitution is a complicated matter (as will be discussed
in the next two sections). In this case, however, it is surely closer to
the truth to credit what the text of the constitution itself says-that
it is founded upon a "desire to establish a framework of supreme law"
expressed by "the people of Antigua and Barbuda.""8 This experience
is typical of that of many of the independent states formerly governed
as part of the British Empire. The substantive adoption of a new con-
stitutional order by some indigenous process was simply put into a
legal form by the old machinery of colonial legal authority.89
In certain circumstances, this masking of an exercise of constitu-
ent authority behind a fagade of legality serves important political
interests. The moment of constitution-making is typically one of in-
tense consultation of the political values of the relevant society.
When, as is often the case, one of those values is that of legal regular-
ity, it may be useful to combine revolutionary change with the
appearance and rhetoric of positive law.90 The eighteenth century
German writer, Friedrich von Gentz, distinguished the American and
French revolutions on exactly this ground. He took the Americans-
notwithstanding the unfortunate references to an unlimited power in
"the people" in the Declaration of Independence-to have acted at all
times within the constraints of the pre-existing legal rights of sub-
jects of the British crown. The French revolutionaries, on the other
hand, acted without the benefit of law. It was, therefore, unsurpris-
ing that excesses followed:
For so soon as in a great undertaking, a step is taken
wholly out of the boundaries of definite rights, and every-
thing is declared lawful, which imaginary necessity, or
unbridled passions inspires, so soon is the immeasurable
field of arbitrary will entered upon; and a revolution, which
has no other principle than to attack the existing constitu-
87. On the authority for Orders-in-Council in United Kingdom law, see BRADLEY
& EWING, supra note 1, at 680-81.
88. The Constitution of Antigua and Barbuda (Schedule 1 to the Antigua and Bar-
buda Constitutional Order).
89. See STANLEY A. DE SMITH, CONSTTTIONAL AND ADmNISTRATIVE LAw 75-85
(4th ed. 1981).
90. See Richard S. Kay, Legal Rhetoric and Revolutionary Change, 7 CARIB. L.
REv. 161 (1997).
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tion, must necessarily proceed to the last extremities of
imagination and criminal guilt.9 '
The Canadian encomium to "lawful" constitutional origins
quoted at the beginning of this section is a good example of the per-
ceived value of invoking the forms of law in connection with any and
every kind of change. Indeed, a recent report on constitutional
amendment for the European Commission for Democracy Through
Law (the Venice Commission), "strongly endorse[d]" the use of a legal
procedure even for the adoption of "new constitutions." Such a course,
according to the Commission, "strengthen[s] the stability, legality
and legitimacy of the new system."92 In such cases, the invocation of
law, no matter how illogical, can, as Claude Klein observes, facilitate
"une transition en douceur."93
In identifying the constituent authority, however, the use of such
legal form may also be distracting. We have to see that a constituent
event has, in fact, occurred before we can describe its source. We
need, therefore, to ask, about the real connection between constitu-
tional change and the prior legal authority cited on its behalf. Is it a
case of genuine validation of the former by the latter or a mere, for-
mal "relationship of validating purport?"94 The more pungent phrase
used by Georges Liet-Veaux about the establishment of the Vichy re-
gime with the legal tools of the Third Republic was that it worked a
"fraud upon the constitution."95 In fact, sometimes the participants in
fundamental constitutional change find the device of legal justifica-
tion objectionable exactly because they perceive the legitimacy of the
91. FRIEDRICH VON GENTZ, THE ORIGIN AND PRINCIPLES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION, COMPARED WITH THE ORIGIN AND PRINCIPLES OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 54-55
(John Quincy Adams trans., 1800) (I am grateful to Chimhne Keitner for this
reference).
92. VENICE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 50, 15.
93. KLEIN, supra note 10, at 195-96.
94. H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 318-21 (1984).
[I]t is not sufficient in order to establish that two rules form part of a single
system to show that one of them provides that rules of a certain description
satisfied by the other are valid . . . . [Wihen such a relationship holds be-
tween two rules it is dangerously misleading to express this fact by stating,
without stressing a very important qualification, that one rule "determines
the validity of the other" or is "the reason for its validity" . . . . [To do so]
concentrates too much on what laws of validating purport say about other
laws and pays too little attention to matters that do not concern the content
of the laws but their mode of recognition.
Id. at 318-21.
95. Georges Liet-Veaux, La "Fraude a la Constitution": Essai d'une Analyse
Juridiques des Rdvolutions Communitaires Ricentes: Italie, Allemand, France, 59 RE-
VUE DU DROIT ET DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET A L'ETRANGER 116 (1943). Liet-
Veaux made clear that legal fraud, in this context, did not always carry a pejorative
connotation. Id. at 145 ("GrAce A la forme r6gulibre qu'elle rev6t, la revolution par
fraude A la constitution dvite bien des troubles et des Ameutes."). See KLEIN, supra
note 10, at 153-56.
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new regime to require an explicit and overt reference to the political
forces that actually did bring it into being. When Ireland adopted the
Constitution of 1937, the enacting institutions took pains to make
clear that they were, in no way, exercising powers granted by the
United Kingdom parliament.96 Similarly, in proposing constitutional
reform in Canada, a committee of the Canadian Bar Association, in
marked contrast to the sentiment expressed by the Ministry of Jus-
tice, unsuccessfully recommended that a new constitution be
implemented without recourse to authorities in the United Kingdom
for the very purpose of effecting a "break with the established legal
order."97
Like it or not, a true constituent authority must act without the
comfort of legal authorization. "Anarchy," the Count of Clermont-
Tonnerre told the French Constituent Assembly, "is a frightening but
necessary transitional stage; the only moment in which a new order
of things can be created."98 Like every human phenomenon, a legal
system must have a beginning. It can't be "turtles all the way
down."99
III. VERSIONS OF THE PEOPLE
The absence of a legal answer to the question of who has constit-
uent authority obliges us to identify a social and/or political one. At
the beginning of the twenty-first century, the identification of such
an authority seems obvious to most people who bother to consider the
question. Constituent authority belongs to the people. 00 So deeply
has this idea rooted itself that many thoughtful writers on constitu-
tionalism take it as a self-evident starting point.' 0 Constitutions,
96. "[The point seems to have been to enact the new constitution without refer-
ence to the old." MARRKU SUKSI, MAKING A CONSTITUTION: THE OUTuNE OF AN
ARGUMENT 71 (quoting ANGELA CLIFFORD, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF EIREIRE-
LAND 88-90 (1983)); Richard S. Kay, Comparative Constitutional Fundamentals, 6
Com. J. INT'L L. 445, 455-58 (1991) [hereinafter Kay, Comparative].
97. Committee on Constitution, Canadian Bar Association, TOWARDS A NEW CA-
NADA 6 (1978) quoted in PETER W. HOGG, CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 59, n.42
(Student ed. 2006). See also KENNETH C. WHEARE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
OF THE COMMONwEALTH 89-113 (1960, reprinted Greenwood Press, 1982).
98. Quoted in Elster, Bootstrapping, supra note 76, at 557.
99. Among many versions of this figure of speech, see Rapanos v. United States,
547 U.S. 715, 754 n.14 (2006) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J. joined by Roberts C.J.
and Thomas and Alito JJ.).
100. In this section and the next, I will use the italic font to indicate that I am
speaking of the people as a will-bearing entity that could exercise constituent author-
ity. Quotations will not be altered. Siey6s and many subsequent writers referred to
the constituent power of "the nation." But as Thomas Paine was shortly to write, the
meaning was the same. See THoMAs PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN (1791), in THE LIFE
AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THoMAs PAINE, 381 (Philip Foner ed., 1974).
101. See Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Law and Sovereignty 3-4 (Oct. 9, 2009). Oxford Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 42/2009, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1486084.
20111 735
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
one commentator has recently noted, may be said to have become a
literary genre defined by the use of the phrase "We the People."102
A. Alternatives to the People
Before proceeding to a discussion of the dimensions and difficul-
ties associated with the now almost universally recognized authority
of the people, it is worth stepping back to note that legitimate consti-
tutions can be, and have been, attributed to quite different sources. It
is entirely familiar, for example, for the basic rules governing a polity
to be located in an instance of divine legislation. The most traditional
Jewish understanding of the Torah is that it was a law given by God
to the people of Israel through revelation to Moses. 03 "According to
the medieval understanding," wrote Carl Schmitt, "only God has a
potestas constituens ... "104 James Wilson, whose emphatic affirma-
tion of the constituent authority of the people was quoted above, saw
that authority itself as flowing from a moral sense instilled and regu-
lated by "divine monitors within us." "Human law," he said, "must
rest its authority, ultimately upon the authority of that law, which is
divine." 05 Today, theocratic states continue to attribute the binding
quality of all law, including constitutional law, to derivation from, or
at least conformity with, God's commandments. The 1979 Constitu-
tion of Iran, among many other references to the paramount force of
God's authority, states in Article 4 that "[aill civil, penal, financial,
economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws
and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle ap-
plies absolutely and generally to all articles of the Constitution as
well as to all other laws and regulations . ..
In societies where the monarchical principle is entrenched (some-
times itself as a manifestation of divine authority), it is only natural
that the king should possess constituent authority. In the early days
of the French Revolution, it was a genuine question as to what the
National Assembly could do without the assent of the king.'07 The
Constitutional Charter of the Bourbon restoration of 1814, at least in
form, rejected the monarch's demotion from constituent to consti-
tuted authority. In it, the King swore fealty to the principles it
established. It maintained, however, "all authority in France resides
in the person of the king." The Charter stated that the King had
102. Ming-Sung Kuo, Cutting the Gordian Knot of Legitimacy Theory? An Anatomy
of Frank Michelman's Presentist Critique of Constitutional Authorship, 7 I-CON 683,
683 (2009).
103. PBXKE Avor, Ch. 1. v.1.
104. SCHMrrr, supra note 1, at 126.
105. Wilson, supra note 12, at 92-93.
106. Constitution of Iran (1979) art. 4. See also art. 2 (Foundational Principles)
affirming belief in "[dlivine revelation and its fundamental role in setting forth the
laws" and "the justice of God in creation and legislation."
107. See Elster, Arguing, supra note 16, at 370.
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promulgated it "voluntarily, and by the free exercise of our royal au-
thority . . . ."108 Many European constitutions of the nineteenth
century were edicts of reigning monarchs and, whatever the actual
circumstances of their creation, were formally expressions of their
wills. When the King of Sardinia-Piedmont, with an eye on the revo-
lutions of 1848, agreed to a constitution, he made sure to enact it
"heeding only of the impulses of our heart ... . by our certain Royal
authority." 0 9 The two 1848 constitutions of Prussia exemplify the
same distinction. Having called a national assembly to draft a consti-
tution, King Frederick William IV declined to accept the instrument
it produced, preferring to promulgate one on his sole authority. 10
The same was true of the first real Turkish constitution, the Ottoman
Constitution of 1876.111 For Carl Schmitt, writing in 1928, the notion
of monarchical constituent authority was a genuine, if problematic,
alternative to the democratic authority of the nation.112 Even today,
some of the constitutions of the monarchies of the Persian Gulf assert
no authority other than the rulers who promulgated them.113
For the most part, the plausibility of these alternative sources of
constituent authority had been exhausted by the time constitutional-
ism became a near-universal value in the twentieth century. A
survey of the world's constitutions finds few which do not found their
authority on some constituent act of the people. Even where that au-
thority is not invoked as the sole basis of the constitution, some
reference to the people's agreement is routinely included. The King of
Bahrain, promulgating the 2002 constitution, did so "in implementa-
tion of the popular will" and "pursuant to the authority entrusted to
us by our great people."" 4 In large part, therefore, consideration of
the nature of constituent authority amounts to an inquiry into what,
in this context, we mean by the people.
We are able, without much difficulty, to understand why God or
the King or the priests might be understood as proper constitution-
making agents. These are identifiable sources with known or pre-
sumed qualities or clearly defined statuses who might be regarded as
suitable agents to produce proper constitutions. A society may attri-
bute to them a wisdom or power or honor or courage or benevolence
108. Constitutional Charter of June 14, 1814, reproduced at http://www.napoleon-
series.org/research/government/legislation/c_charter.html. See Jaume, supra note 35,
at 76.
109. Constitution of Sardinia (Mar. 1848).
110. JUSTINE DAVIS RANDERS-PEHRSON, GERMANS AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1848-
1849, 403-38 (2001).
111. ERGUN OSBUDUM & OMER F. OQKAYA, DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF
CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN TURKEY 8-9 (2009).
112. SCHMITr, supra note 1, at 77, 18-130.
113. Kuwait Constitution, 1962; The Basic Law of the Sultanate of Oman, 1996;
Permanent Constitution of the State of Qatar, 2004. See also Constitution of Brunei
Darussalem, 1984.
114. Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 2002.
2011]1 737
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
that seems good in the formulation of fundamental law. Or they
might be believed to have an entitlement to make these rules accord-
ing to some supra-legal normative system.115 The people's attraction
as a constituent authority is of a different kind. It appears premised
on a particular dogma, the political rightness of self-government.
That principle rests on the axiom that no person ought to be subject
to the will of another absent his or her own consent to be so bound. It
follows that, since all government depends on the capacity to coerce,
all government must be legitimated by some actual or presumed
agreement from its subjects. It must, in the words of the American
Declaration of Independence, "derive [its] just powers from the con-
sent of the governed." 16 This idea is explicit or implicit in every
argument that lays the origin of government in original contract. 117
Constitution-making by the people supplies the necessary consent of
the governed to the law to be made by the constituted powers. The
result of such a founding is summed up in Lincoln's reference to "the
government of the people, by the people and for the people" and con-
tinues regularly to appear in the modern literature on
constitutionalism.1 1 8
Recognizing, on these grounds, the constituent authority of the
people may be clear enough as an abstract proposition. When, how-
ever, we ask how that general proposition translates to the authority
to make a particular constitution in a particular time and place, a
number of complications arise. I examine some of these in the follow-
ing sections.
B. Finding a People
If we regard the people's constituent authority as deriving from a
right of self-government, we need to start its specification by some
reference to the human beings who are to be governed by the consti-
tution it creates. Although we can imagine other possibilities, it is
115. See Norman Jacobson, Knowledge, Tradition and Authority: A Note on the
American Experience, in AurHORITY (NoMos VOL. 1), supra note 33, at 113, 121 (refer-
ring to the American political system as being "without the divinity which has usually
hedged the figure of the founder, without a theory of personal fealty, without a mys-
tique surrounding the exercise of power, without an image of the special skills and
special knowledge competent to rule- without, in a word, traditional political
authority").
116. Declaration of Independence, 1776, para. 2.
117. E.g., LOCKE, supra note 8, at 63.
118. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), reprinted in 2 ABRA-
HAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS (1859-1865) 536 (D. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).
,See also e.g. James Tully, The Imperialism of Modern Constitutional Democracy, in
THE PARADOX OF CONSTITLYTIONALISM, supra note 8, 325, 320 ("I take 'constituent pow-
ers' to be the powers of humans (individually and collectively) to govern themselves.").
More substantive justifications are also sometimes suggested. See John 0. McGinnis
& Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 383
(2007) (claiming the super-majoritarian process of constitution-making and amend-
ment produce superior rules of government).
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reasonable to assume we are dealing with some group of individuals
associated with some territory. In theory, residence in a common geo-
graphical space might be sufficient to define a people. But, in
practice, something more is necessary. I can map out a large contigu-
ous area, say, the southern hemisphere, and identify its population.
Even if I were somehow able to assemble a fair representative of that
population, however, it would be odd to think of its decisions as acts
of the people of the southern hemisphere.119 When we speak of a peo-
ple capable of making decisions about a constitution, we presuppose
an association that has "a type of being that is more intense in com-
parison to the natural existence of some human group living
together."120 There must be, that is, commonalities that transcend
physical space. Put another way, locating a constituent authority in a
people takes for granted that there is some plausible way of mapping
a pre-legal (if not pre-political) group onto the projected population of
the prospective state.121
It is impossible fully to understand this problem without taking
into account the fact (pace Rousseau 22) that no people can act di-
rectly. Whatever will we attribute to the people must be manifested in
some process of representation, deliberation and decision that can
bind the population universally. In an established legal system, such
a power to bind can be based on positive law but we are now, by hy-
pothesis, in a world where there is no law to invest a representative
with this power. Willingness to cede authority in these circumstances
must depend on a shared sense of the rightness of treating such a
representative decision as the decision of every individual. Any such
process depends on the pre-legal propriety of dealing with a mass of
individuals as a single thing and that, in turn, presumes that all of
the people affected share, at least at a general level, the same inter-
ests with respect to the decisions that are to be made. In the Virginia
119. See KEYrNER, supra note 77, at 10 ("A given territory is not necessarily a na-
tion; self-identified members of a single nation do not necessarily inhabit the same
territory . . . .").
120. ScHMITT, supra note 1, at 243. In its unrepresented state, the people is as-
sumed to be "a simple, inarticulate, immanent unity, generated through the
dissolution of interpersonal boundaries." Lior Barshack, Constitutional Power as a
Body: Outline of a Constitutional Theology, 56 U. TOR. L.J. 185, 193 (2006).
121. See Stephen Tierney, "We the Peoples": Constituent Power and Constitutional-
ism in Plurinational States, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITIONALISM, supra note 8,
229, 231. Preuss quotes Rousseau that to have a constitution a people must "find itself
already bound together by some original association, interest or agreement [so as to
be in a position to combine] the cohesion of an ancient people with the malleability of
a new one." Preuss, Powermaking, supra note 20, at 659. The definition of a people
capable of making a domestic constitution is, from an international perspective, iden-
tical to the definition of a people entitled to self-determination. For a sensitive
treatment, see KEITNER, supra note 77.
122. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, Book IV, Ch. 14 ("Sover-
eignty cannot be represented .... Every law the people has not ratified in person is
null and void.")
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Convention that ratified the United States Constitution, George Ma-
son worried about granting the taxing power to the proposed federal
Congress: "[I]t is to be determined by those who have neither knowl-
edge of our situation, nor a common interest with us nor a fellow-
feeling for us."12 3 The need for confidence in a "fellow-feeling" is espe-
cially acute with regard to constituent decisions. What Joseph Weiler
has said about democratic decisionmaking within a polity, follows a
fortiori for the process that effectively creates a polity: "The authority
and legitimacy of a majority to compel a minority exists only within
political boundaries defined by a demos. Simply put, if there is no
demos, there can be no democracy . .. . A demos, a people, cannot
after all be a bunch of strangers."12 4
This conclusion has been rephrased by Ulrich Preuss: "[T]he con-
stitutional state presupposes some minimum degree of prepolitical
sameness and homogeneity of the constituent power."125 The exact
kinds of unities that define a constituent people, however, have been
a matter of substantial debate. The problem has received a great deal
of academic attention in recent years in connection with proposals to
create a European constitution.12 6 The discussion has been stylized
into two contending positions, roughly tracking nineteenth-century
arguments on the essential characteristics of a nation. On one side,
the people refers to a natural organism, a Volk, what Jirgen
Habermas referred to as "a community of fate shaped by common de-
scent, language and history."127 In its crudest form, this comes down
to matters of race and ethnicity. More broadly put, it may be based on
shared culture and experience. On the other side, the people is a polit-
ical construction, a voluntary association of rational individuals
acting on the basis of shared principles.1 28 On this second view, the
relevant people is itself partly created in the process of constitution-
making. This understanding accounts for the perception of a paradox
in popular constitution-making since, according to it, the people both
creates and is created by the constitution.12 9
123. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 30-31 (Jonathan Elliot
ed., 1888).
124. JOSEPH H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: "DO THE NEW CLOTHES
HAVE AN EMPEROR AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 337 (1999).
125. Preuss, Powermaking, supra note 20, at 659.
126. See, e.g., Miguel Poiares Maduro, Europe and the Constitution: What If This Is
As Good As It Gets?, in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: BEYOND THE STATE 74, 81-82
(Joseph H.H. Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003).
127. Jirgen Habermas, Why Europe needs a Constitution, 11 NEW LEFT REVIEW 5,
15 (Sept.-Oct. 2001) [hereinafter Habermas, Why Europe].
128. See Preuss, Powermaking, supra note 20, at 644-47; Dominique Schnapper,
The Idea of a Nation, 18 QuAL. Soc. 177, 181-83 (1995); Anthony D. Smith, National
Identity and the Idea of European Unity, 68 INT'L AFFAIRS 55, 56 (1992).
129. See Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker, Introduction, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTI-
TUTIONALISM, supra note 8, 1-8.
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This need not, however, be an either-or question. We are inter-
ested in whether or not all the circumstances of a given group of
human beings are such that it makes sense to treat their interests
collectively for the purposes of constitution-making. Experience tells
us that a long-term successful state need not have the ethnic-linguis-
tic uniformity that characterizes the Romantic Volk. Switzerland
provides the standard example of a multi-linguistic society with a
stable constitutional structure. The Italian state was assembled suc-
cessfully during an era when "it was not possible to speak of a
collective 'Italian self."" 30 Jose Ortega y Gasset reasoned that "[ilf
the XIX-th century concept of nationality had existed in the Middle
Ages, England, France, Spain and Germany would never have been
born."'a3 Perhaps the most stunning example is the United States
where a genuine civic identity has been forged out of a riot of cul-
tures, languages, religions, and traditions.132 That there now exists
an American culture is as much a consequence of the success of the
American polity as a cause of it.'13 Experience, therefore, belies the
claim that the existence of the people as "some primordial substrate"
is a necessary precondition to the creation of the constitution.13 4 The
only essential thing is the existence of a "common sphere of public
debate and reasoning."135 It is clear, in fact, that, by itself, ethnic or
linguistic unity is insufficient to constitute a people for these pur-
poses. There must also be some shared political consciousness. 3 6
It does not follow, however, that the presence or absence of cul-
tural-linguistic homogeneity is irrelevant to the likelihood of a
constituent authority linked to a people. At least in certain historical-
political contexts, the amalgamation of some group of human beings
into a workable constitutional unit has proven impossible exactly be-
cause of the inability of the individuals to see each other as part of a
common people. The Habsburg monarchy more or less successfully
maintained political hegemony over highly diverse populations for
hundreds of years but when, in the nineteenth century, for many rea-
130. Giuseppe Federico Mancini, Europe: The Case for Statehood, 4 EuRoP. L.J. 29,
36 (1998).
131. JOSE ORTEGA Y GASSET, THE REVOLT OF THE MASSES 174 (1932). See also
Habermas, Why Europe, supra note 127, at 16 (the "emergence of national conscious-
ness involved a painful process of abstraction, leading from local and dynastic
identities to national and democratic ones").
132. Herbert J. Gans, The American Kaleidoscope, Then and Now, in REINVENTING
THE MELTING POT: THE NEW IMMIGRANTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TO BE AMERICAN 33-46
(Tamar Jacoby ed., 2004).
133. See ROSENFELD, supra note 43, at 158-63.
134. Jurgen Habermas, Remarks on Dieter Grimm's "Does Europe Need a Constitu-
tion?" 1 EuRop. L.J. 303, 305-06 (1995) [hereinafter Habermas, Remarks].
135. Preuss, Powermaking, supra note 20, at 648. See also Dieter Grimm, Does
Europe Need a Constitution? 1 EuRop. L. J. 282, 297 (1995) [hereinafter Grimm,
Need]; Habermas, Remarks, supra note 134, at 305-06.
136. This is what, for Schmitt, constituted the difference between a "nation" and a
mere "people." SCHMITT, supra note 1, at 127.
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sons, those people began to focus on their identities as members of
more narrowly defined nationalities, that entity became unsustain-
able.137 The difficulty is particularly acute in jurisdictions where
disparate communities share a historically entrenched mutual hostil-
ity.138 The intense but futile attempts at constitution-making in
Cyprus over the last fifty years is a dramatic example of how inter-
group antagonism can frustrate the construction of a common iden-
tity for a geographically defined population.139 Habermas recognized
the relevance of pre-legal commonalities to the feasibility of the for-
mation of a polity when he noted that the development of national
consciousness was "facilitated by the stabilizing contents of tradi-
tional communities." 1 4 0 The American experience does not, itself,
demonstrate the invariable sufficiency of a politically defined people.
The United States had the relatively unusual advantage of an ex-
tended period of immigration and assimilation, allowing it to
accommodate its diverse ethnic communities over time and in rela-
tively small pieces. 141 At least ordinarily, "without [a] resonant
fiction of relatedness through memory, and myth and history and/or
real kinship, a real sense of membership is hard to come by."142
In the end, there can be no precise algorithm specifying the con-
ditions for defining a people capable of exercising constituent
authority.143 Dieter Grimm summed up the minimum conditions:
"All that is necessary is for the society to have formed an awareness
of belonging together that can support majority decisions and solidar-
ity efforts, and for it to have the capacity to communicate about its
137. See Vicron-L. TAPIE, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE HABSBURG MONARCHY 317-92
(Stephen Hardman trans.,1971).
138. See Hanna Lerner, The People of the Constitution: Constitution-Making, Legit-
imacy, Identity 21 (2004), available at http://www.columbia.edulculpolisci/pdf-files/
aspalerner. Even some of those countries that are often cited as examples of success-
ful multi-ethnic polities seem to have achieved something less than a unitary polity.
The constitutional status of Canada is, at best, a kind of modus vivendi between
French and English-speaking populations. This is, in part, because much of the
French population believes the supposed constituent authority, acting in 1982, did not
represent a single Canadian people. The problem of a single Canadian polity has been
further complicated by recognition of the national claims of indigenous peoples. See
Richard S. Kay, Canada's Constitutional Cul-de-Sac, 35 Am. REV. OF CAN. STUD. 705
(2005).
139. VAN COUFOUDAIS, CYPRUs: A CONTEMPORARY PROBLEM IN HISTORICAL PER-
SPECTIVE (2006).
140. Habermas, Why Europe, supra note 127, at 16.
141. See Gans, supra note 132, at 33-46.
142. WEILER, supra note 124, at 345 (citing Smith, supra note 128). On the relative
force of rational and inherent criteria of national belonging, see KEITNER, supra note
77, at 69-86.
143. It is hard, therefore, to take seriously Bruce Ackerman's suggestion that al-
though "there is lots of room for good faith disagreement on the right numbers," a
constituent process is triggered by evidence of "the deep support of 20 percent of the
citizenry, and the additional support of 31% of private citizens." ACKERMAN, supra
note 17, at 274-75.
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goals and problems discursively."144 We require, that is, common fac-
tors sufficient to permit us to perceive the collectivity as capable-
through some kind of procedure-of acting as "a person with all the
attributes of personality, conscience and will."14 5 It is idle, however,
to think that there can be an act of constitution-making that banishes
the centrifugal tendency of distinct historical-cultural sympathies
and that one can always and everywhere construct a purely demotic
polity, one based solely on loyalty to shared civic values.146
C. The Voice of the People
Even if we are satisfied that a constitution is being created for a
sufficiently coherent population, identifying the exercise of constitu-
ent authority by the people presents further difficulties. Recognition
of constituent authority in God, or the King or the priests refers to
identifiable individuals whose decisions are fairly traceable to them.
The direct active participation of significant parts of the population
in the deliberations associated with the drafting of constitutions, on
the other hand, is usually a matter of form and rhetoric.147 The peo-
ple, we have already noted, cannot exercise its will directly.
References to the people as a constitution-maker must be to the "im-
aginary collective body of the group" capable of signifying the assent
of the real human beings who are to be governed by the constituted
power.' 48 We need, therefore, to identify some authentic representa-
tive of the people whose decisions may plausibly be attributed to that
body. A series of possible surrogates with claims of varying plausibil-
ity have been successfully employed.
In many instances, it has been assumed that an ordinary legisla-
ture, existing under an established constitution, is sufficiently
representative to speak for the people in creating a new one. That was
the principal mode of constitution-making in the American states im-
mediately after independence 49 and legislatures continue to be the
144. See Grimm, Need, supra note 135, at 295-96.
145. Li0N DUGUIT, TRAITI DE DRoIT CONsTITUIONNEL (2d ed. 1921) quoted and
translated in KEITNER, supra note 77, at 27. See also id. at 75 ("While a group can
have an identity and even an interest defined as the aggregate of the identities and
interests of its individual members, in order to have a will of its own it must be in
some sense a 'collective being.'").
146. See Lerner, supra note 138, at 42-43 ("Not all problems are constitutionally
solvable. As long as individual tensions over the identity of the polity are not settled,
prepolitical forces will threaten constitutional unity."). Cf Preuss, Powermaking,
supra note 20, at 647, 660 (expressing a preference for a principally demotic polity).
For a recent attempt to reconcile a polity based on shared commitment to abstract
principles with the inevitability of particular attachments, see JAN WERNER-MOLLER,
CONsTurrIONAL PATRIOTISM (2007).
147. See Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins & Justin Blount, Does the Process of Con-
stitution-Making Matter? 3 ANN. REV. OF L. & Soc. Sci. 201, 206 (2009).
148. Barshack, supra note 120, at 186.
149. See WOOD, supra note 10, at 306-07.
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most common site of deliberation and drafting in the constitution-
making process.' 50 The 1984 Constitution of Guinea-Bissau was
adopted by the national legislature, "acting as a faithful interpreter
of the will of the people and exercising its responsibilities as the high-
est sovereign organ."151 Likewise, the 1993 Constitution of the Czech
Republic was an enactment of the Czech Parliament. Its preamble
referred to its adoption by "[wle the citizens of the Czech Republic
[acting] through our freely elected representatives."152 Some legisla-
tures have simply changed their names before exercising such power.
That is what the French National Assembly did on July 9, 1789 mak-
ing itself the Constituent Assembly.'53 The Territorial Assembly of
the Republic of Guinea, on declaring independence from France in
1958, announced itself to be the National Sovereign Constituent As-
sembly.154 Such a procedure, blurring the basic distinction between
constituted and constituent power, has been the target of serious ob-
jections. Although chosen in fair elections, ordinary legislators are
supposed to act within the limits created by the constitution and, in-
sofar as they presume to alter those limits, they acts as judges in
their own causes.' 55 The constitution, charged one critic of the sup-
posed constituent authority of the Pennsylvania colonial legislature
in 1776, "is an act which can be done to them, but cannot be done by
them."'56 It is arguable, moreover, that ordinary legislative elections,
in which a range of workaday public matters are in contest, may be
defective vehicles for representing the fundamental constitutional
preferences of the people. The act of constitution-making is an ex-
traordinary kind of legislation in which the focus must be narrow and
the deliberation intense. It requires what Bruce Ackerman has called
"constitutional politics" to be distinguished from the ordinary politics
150. See Jennifer Widner, Constitution-Writing in Post-Conflict Situations, 49 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1513, 1523 (2008).
151. Constitution of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, 1984, Preamble.
152. Constitution of the Czech Republic, Dec. 16, 1992. On the adoption procedure,
see Rainer Grote, The Czech Republic, Introductory Note in Constitutions of the
Countries of the World, available at http://www.oceanalaw.com/gateway/gateway.
asp?ID=31&SessionlD={1EF71CD7-70B2-4D22-A2B4-9C190A88563B}.
153. TACKErr, supra note 77, at 211.
154. See Rainer Grote, The Republic of Guinea, Introductory Note, in Constitutions
of the Countries of the World, available at http://www.oceanalaw.com/gateway/gate
way.asp?ID=31&SessionlD={4030D653-5F6D-4EF3-BB55-2346A7038EF8}.
155. See Elster, Arguing, supra note 16, at 386-88; Elster, Forces, supra note 79, at
380-82; Ginsburg et al., supra note 147, at 212. A recent survey of the creation of
constitutions over a long period and in many jurisdictions, however, failed to identify
any strong correlation between legislative constitution-making and extensive legisla-
tive power in the resulting constitutions. See id. at 212-13.
156. Quoted in WOOD, supra note 10, at 337. See also SIEYtS, supra note 6, at 129




of everyday legislation. "The first is a decision by the .. . people; the
second by their government."157
One response to this concern is to hold that legislatures may ex-
ercise constituent authority but only after an election in which the
possibility of a new constitution is a central issue. We have already
seen the example of the Sri Lankan constitution of 1972, adopted af-
ter an election in which the prevailing party had pledged to turn the
parliament into a constituent assembly. When the first post-war
French parliament was elected in 1945, the voters were asked "Do
you want the assembly elected today to be a constituent assem-
bly?"158 Alternatively, the structure of the legislature might be
modified when it undertakes to create a constitution. Many constitu-
tions call for amendments to be considered in a combined sitting of
the two houses of a bicameral legislature. 159 When the Constitution
of Bangladesh was created in 1972, it was adopted by a Constituent
Assembly consisting of some representatives who had been elected to
the National Assembly of Pakistan from the former East Pakistan
and some who had been elected to the Provincial Assembly of East
Pakistan.16 0
The paradigmatic (if not the most common) modern procedure for
writing a new constitution is the extraordinary, purpose-made Con-
stituent Assembly or the Constitutional Convention. A key
characteristic of such bodies is exactly the fact they are not provided
for in prior law. Such lack of authorization in this context, of course,
is not a defect. It is, as we have seen, an inevitable aspect of constitu-
ent authority which must be located outside of the pre-existing legal
order. For this reason, eighteenth-century American states rejected
the constituent authority of the legislatures and insisted on special
purpose constitutional conventions.e16 It is also why the Philadelphia
Convention of 1787 that drafted the United States Constitution felt
justified in by-passing the approval of state legislatures and submit-
ting the instrument to special conventions to be called in each
state.162When those conventions had approved it, it was understood
157. ACKERMAN, supra note 17, at 6. For a sensitive discussion of the advantages
and disadvantages of legislative constitution-making, see Jon Elster, Legislatures as
Constituent Assemblies, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES
IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 181 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006)
[hereinafter Elster, Legislatures].
158. Elster, Legislatures, supra note 157, at 182.
159. E.g., Constitution of France, 1958, art. 89; Bahrain Constitution, 2002, art.
120.
160. Introductory Note, The People's Republic of Bangladesh, in Constitutions of
Countries of the World, available at http://www.oceanalaw.com/gateway/gateway.asp
?ID=31&SessionlD={4030D653-5F6D-4EF3-BB55-2346A7038EF8}. On the various
institutional combinations of legislative and constituent authority, see Elster, Legis-
latures, supra note 157, at 182-83.
161. See WOOD, supra note 10, at 313-18.
162. See Kay, Illegality, supra note 11, at 72-75.
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to have received the assent of the people. "The people acted upon it,"
Chief Justice Marshall was later to say "in the only manner in which
they can act safely, effectively and wisely,on such a subject, by as-
sembling in Convention."163 This is the "body of extraordinary
representatives" of which Sieybs wrote that it "takes the place of the
assembly of the nation." 6 4
The distinction between the acts of representatives elected to a
legislature and those elected to a constituent assembly is, it must be
observed, more a matter of symbol than substance. At one time, the
qualifications for voters to the latter may have been more liberal.
That was the case in the United States in 1787-89.165 But, with the
advent of universal suffrage, it is hard to believe that the quality of
representation could be very different. In this respect, the observa-
tion in 1788 of the American lexicographer and essayist, Noah
Webster, is still apt. A constitutional convention, he noted, was "a
body of men chosen by the people in the manner they choose the
members of the Legislature, and commonly composed of the same
men; but at any rate they are neither wiser nor better."166
The final and most direct method of expression of the people is
the constitutional referendum and it has become a near staple of
modern constitution-making. Of twenty-three new constitutions
promulgated in this century, thirteen have been approved in refer-
enda.167 Carl Schmitt found the "people's constitution-making will
always expresses itself only in a fundamental yes or no and thereby
[it] reaches the political decision that constitutes the content of the
constitution." At least "[tiheoretically" he went on, the plebiscite "cor-
responds thoroughly to the democratic principle and to the idea of the
people's constitution-making power."168 Notwithstanding the direct
163. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819).
164. SIEYtS, supra note 6, at 130.
165. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES: THE ROLE OF THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN IN
THE FRAMING AND ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, at 32, 108-11 (Patrick T.
Conley & John P. Kaminski eds., 1988). On the use of special electoral rules in the
election of constituent assemblies, see Elster, Legislatures at 187-89.
166. Quoted in WOOD, supra note 10, at 379.
167. Burundi (2005), Central African Republic (2004), Comores, (2001), Democratic
Republic of Congo (2004), Republic of Congo (2001), Cote d'Ivoire (2000), Iraq (2005),
Myanmar (2008), Qatar (2003), Rwanda (2003), Senegal (2001), Serbia (2006), and
Thailand (2007). The constitutions promulgated without referenda are from Afghani-
stan (2004), Bahrain (2002), Bhutan (2008), East Timor (2002), Finland (2000),
Kosovo (2008), Maldives (2008), Nepal (2007), Sudan (2005), and Swaziland (2005).
Almost all of the latter group, however, still declare themselves to be the work of the
people. The survey is based on material in the Constitutions of Countries of the World
database, available at http://www.oceanalaw.com. I have, of course, had to exercise
some judgment as to what exactly amounts to a "new constitution." See also SUKSI,
supra note 96, at 12-13 (1995) (noting the high incidence of constitutions providing for
referenda in constitutional revision).
168. SCHMITT, supra note 1, at 134. See also Barshack, supra note 120, at 213 ("The
potential political advantages of the referendum in certain, mostly critical, historical
contexts derive from its semi-religious dimensions, its capacity to occasion an enact-
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participation of large numbers of people, however, there are well-
known problems in associating this kind of constitution-making with
the constituent authority of the people. Designating the individuals
qualified to participate implicates all of the issues involved in identi-
fying a people canvassed in the last section. There will always be
numerous ways to specify the ballot question or questions and the
selection of one or another method will, as a practical matter, facili-
tate or frustrate alternative outcomes. 69 In general, as Schmitt
recognized, the people's ability to express itself directly is drastically
limited. It is confined to the propositions that the organizers of the
referendum put before it. It can dispose but not propose. 170 It is im-
possible for the people to state its will with nuance or qualification. It
cannot reconsider and revise. Even these crude expressions of its will
may be rendered only infrequently.
These doubts are reinforced by the historical association of ple-
biscitary democracy with totalitarian government. Napoleon is
credited with developing the plebiscite as a prop for authoritarianism
and the techniques of electoral manipulation have, if anything, been
radically advanced with the advent of electronic mass communica-
tion.' 7 ' The constitution of Haiti, adopted in 1987 after the fall of the
Duvalier dictatorship, actually states that "[gleneral elections to
amend the Constitution by referendum are strictly forbidden."172
This kind of criticism, however, (indeed any of the criticisms that
have been discussed for various means of representing the people)
must be tempered by our recognition that the people is not a flesh-
and-blood entity, much less the bearer of a genuine single psychologi-
cal will. The perfectly unmediated voice of the people is necessarily a
fiction.
ment of the sovereign body."). On the peculiar affinity of referenda and constituent
decision-making, see Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: A Theoretical En-
quiry, 72 MOD. L. REV. 360 (2009).
169. A useful recent survey of the numerous contingent choices in the context of
self-determination referenda for non-self-governing territories is Chimne Keitner,
Associate Statehood: Principles and Prospects, 3 FAROESE L. REV. 13, 27-37 (2003).
170. See CARL Scmirr, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 89 (Jeffrey Seitzer trans., 2004)
("The people can only respond yes or no. They cannot advise, deliberate or discuss.");
Preuss, Roundtable, supra note 20, at 121 (discussing the power of the 1989 Round-
table in the German Democratic Republic to frame the questions for a constitutional
plebiscite).
171. 1 Louis MADELIN, THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE 69, 159, 243 (E.F. Buckley
trans., 1967). On the structural defects of direct democracy, see Alan Hamlin, The
Voice of the People, 10 CONST. POL. ECON. 367, 370-73 (1999); SUKSI, supra note 96, at
8-9, 13. See also VENICE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 50, at 37.
172. Constitution of the Republic of Haiti, 1987, arts. 284-3; SuKsi, supra note 96,
at 8.
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D. The People in Time
A further problem with the constituent authority of the people
seems to be built into the structure of popular constitutionalism. Two
propositions are crucial. First, constitutions are written, in part, to
establish stable rules to distinguish areas of potential public regula-
tion from those of private autonomy. To accomplish this, those rules
need to be in force for some reliably long period, to be, at least, more
durable than ordinary legislation. 173 Second, as we have already
noted, the constituent authority of the people derives from the as-
sumed political rightness of self-government, the idea that people
should be bound only by rules and institutions to which they have
somehow consented. These two propositions are in tension. As the
constitution ages, it become less plausible for the members of society
to see it as a manifestation of their own decisions. Assuming the orig-
inal constitution-making emerged in an acceptable representative
process, the constitution's authority will be defensible at the moment
of enactment and for some time thereafter. All democratic rule mak-
ing assumes the law-making people to be a temporally extended
entity, one that can "bind itself" over some period.' 74 But this tempo-
ral identification cannot be indefinite. The constitution-makers,
acting at time to, may be a proper surrogate for the people at time to or
time t1o . That will be much more doubtful at time t1 oo or time t2 00.175
Noah Webster, writing during the debate on ratification of the United
States Constitution, contended that the attempt to create a "perpet-
ual" constitution assumed a right to "legislate for those over whom
we have as little authority as we have over a nation in Asia."176
This has been a prominent theme ever since constitutions began
to be identified with the people. Various devices have been suggested
to refresh the legitimacy of such constitutions. Rousseau insisted on
the necessity of "fixed periodical assemblies [at which] the people is
legitimately called together by law, without need of any formal sum-
moning." The first question on the agenda of such assemblies was
always to be "[d]oes it please the Sovereign to preserve the present
form of government?"177 During the French Revolution, as men-
tioned, both Sieybs and Condorcet had argued for the necessity of
173. Obviously, I am only stating not defending this proposition. I attempt to elab-
orate this purpose of constitutions in Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 16 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998).
174. See Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CON-
STITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 221 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
175. See Frank I. Michelman, Reply to Ming-Sung Kuo, 7 I-CoN 715, 722 (2009)
[hereinafter Michelman, Reply]. For an attempt to describe a single, popular tempo-
rally extended political entity, see, e.g., JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A
THEORY OF CONSTITTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001).
176. Quoted in WOOD, supra note 10, at 379.
177. ROUSSEAU, supra note 122, at Book III Ch. 13, Ch. 18.
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periodic revision by extraordinary assemblies.a78 In a letter to James
Madison, Thomas Jefferson insisted that no constitution could bind
for more than nineteen years, which he calculated to be the lifespan
of a "generation." After that time, the enforcement of a constitution
"is an act of force, not of right."e7 9 Fourteen American states cur-
rently have constitutional provisions calling for referenda at
intervals ranging from nine to twenty years in which the electorate
must be asked whether or not to call a constitutional convention to
revise the constitution.' 0 The logic (if not the mathematics) of this
position is impeccable once we have concluded that constituent au-
thority is a device for securing the consent of the governed to the
coercive acts of the state. The practical problems with time-limited
constitutions, however, are obvious. The prospect of frequent rewrit-
ing of the constitution could have, as Madison argued in his reply to
Jefferson, a most unsettling effect on human relations.' 8 '
There is presumably some period of time that represents the best
trade-off between these two imperatives.1 82 During that period, how-
ever it is necessary to accept that the legitimacy of the constitution
will depend on an increasingly remote and, therefore a decreasingly
authentic, expression of the decision of the people.183
178. See Jaume, supra note 35, at 70-71.
179. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison. "The Earth Belongs to the
Living" (Paris, Sept. 6, 1789) (on file at Electronic Text Center, University of Virginia
Library, etext.virginia.edultoc/modeng/public/JefLett.html); see KLEIN supra note 10,
at 138-40.
180. See ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF
CONSTITUTIONS 13-14 (2009).
181. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (New York, Feb. 4, 1790) (on
file at www.constitution.org/jm/17900204_tj.htm). See also Madison's discussion of
the dangers of frequent constitutional revision in THE FEDERALIST No. 49, 313, 313-15
(C. Rossiter ed., 1961). One obvious solution to this difficulty is the design of an
amendment procedure that will allow an adequate surrogate for the people to act from
time to time in an incremental and therefore manageable way. But for reasons al-
ready discussed, there are limits to the extent to which it is possible legally to contain
the constituent authority. Constitutional amendment procedures, crafted exactly in
order to maintain the long term continuity of the constitution, must, depending on the
skill and foresight of the constitutional drafters, sooner or later, collide with whatever
we have determined to accept as representing the will of the constituent authority.
See Kay, Chrononomy, supra note 31, at 43.
182. A careful recent consideration of this question is ELKINS ET AL., supra note
180, at 12-35.
183. Alternatively, we could give up our conviction that the people who wrote the
constitution possessed authority because they were exercising the right of self-deter-
mination for their and for succeeding generations. We could decide, instead, that their
authority derives from the fact that they possessed certain virtues that qualified them
to create a proper constitution. This does seem to be at least part of the constituent
authority of the American constitution-makers. The drafters, if not the ratifiers, of
that instrument have acquired the reputation of being extraordinarily gifted states-
men. At the time, Jefferson, then the United States minister to France, described
them as "an assembly of demi-gods." Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, "Revolt of the
Nobles" (Paris, Aug. 30, 1787) (on file at From Revolution to Reconstruction at
www.let.rug.nl/usa/P/tj3/writings/brf/jefl62.htm). The chairman of the National En-
dowment for the Humanities concluded his 2009 "Constitution Day" message with the
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E. The people or the Peoples
One last problem in the attribution of constituent authority to
the people requires examination. That is the fact that so many effec-
tive modern constitutions have been enacted as a result of a process
of elite negotiation among important interests in a given society. The
constitutions of the nineteenth century, for example, may, in sub-
stance, be seen as jointly created by the monarch and the leaders of
the popular resistance.18 4 More recent variations will be discussed
below. The difficulty arises when we try to identify the role of the
people or some plausible surrogate in these acts of constitution-mak-
ing. Among modern constitutions, these bargained out instruments
seem to fall into two classes. In the first are those that follow from the
agreement of groups whose aspirations can be associated with certain
geographical areas so that the resulting constitution sets out a terri-
torially defined federation. While we will need to reconsider the
matter, the United States Constitution of 1787 might be put into this
category as the process of ratification was undertaken state by
state.185 The German constitution of 1871 was, in express terms, an
"eternal alliance" among five German states for the purpose of estab-
lishing a "confederation."18 6 The Basic Law of 1949 was also adopted
by approval of state parliaments 87 and German reunification in
1989, while formally effected under Article 23 of the Basic Law al-
lowing accession of new territories, was worked out in a treaty
between the eastern and western German states.188 The same kind of
process can result whenever the constituent parties are more or less
geographically concentrated ethnic groups. Among recent examples,
the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Iraq are notable. 89
There is a second category of negotiated constituent authority.
Constitutions are sometimes formed as part of the settlement of in-
ternal divisions not linked to specific territories. The new
constitutions of the states of central and Eastern Europe after the
flat out statement that "[tihe underlying Constitutional framework [of 1787], which
established limitations on government, has provided the world the most enlightened
model of governance ever created." Available at http://edsitement.neh.gov/Constitu
tionDay/constitutionindex2. html#founders.
184. Schmitt thought such processes merely postponed a determination of where
the real constituent authority resided. See SCHMrrr, supra note 1, at 105.
185. United States Constitution, Article VII. See text at infra notes 218-21.
186. Constitution of the German Empire (1871) Preamble (translation available at
http-//en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution of_theGermanEmpire).
187. The elected German officials successfully convinced the occupying allied pow-
ers that popular participation should be avoided in light of the "temporary" character
of the Basic Law. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITrTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY 10 (1994).
188. See QuNrr, supra note 61, at 51, 103-23.
189. Brett Dakin, The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. The
Republika Srpska: Human Rights in a Multi-Ethnic Bosnia, 15 HARv. Hum. RTs. J.
245 (2002); Joseph Khawam, A World of Lessons: The Iraqi Constitutional Experiment
in Comparative Perspective 37 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTs L. REV. 717 (2006).
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collapse of communism were drafted and enacted through popularly
elected bodies of various kinds. But many of the elements of the re-
formed constitutions were effectively decided in "roundtable talks"
establishing the path that the transition was to take. The partici-
pants in those talks were representatives of the departing
government and of various opposition groups. They were neither cho-
sen, nor did they deliberate, as constituent assemblies, as any kind of
surrogate for the people.'90 The extent to which they made decisions
that determined constitutional change varied considerably. The Bul-
garian Roundtable of 1990 took an especially strong view of its ability
to shape future events. At an early stage, it reached an agreement
that its decisions were to have "supreme legislative status." "The act-
ing National Assembly was expected to vote 'automatically' and with
no corrections to the texts of the constitutional amendments and laws
agreed on at the [Roundtable.]" and did so.' 9 ' The South African Con-
stitution of 1997, discussed at length below, is another prominent
example.192
These negotiated constitutions create obvious problems for the
claim that the people are the sole legitimate constituent authority.
The radically mediated participation in these processes of the human
beings who will be subject to such constitutions is something quite
different from their role in directly elected constituent assemblies or
constitutional referenda. It was just this kind of constitution, one
brokered by discrete corporate interests, that the National Assembly
rejected in 1789, when it insisted on voting by head instead of by or-
der.' 93 Writing about the practice of "voting by order" in Britain and
pre-revolutionary France, Thomas Paine declared that "[wle have but
one order in America and that of the highest degree, the order of sov-
ereignty and of this order every citizen is a member in his own
personal right."194
It will be observed that doubts about negotiated constitutions are
manifestations of the same concerns already examined in connection
with the capacity of a given population to form a single people capable
of exercising constituent authority. 95 One response is to posit two
different kinds of states, depending on which kind of constituent au-
190. See generally ROUNDTABLE TALKs, supra note 20.
191. Rumyana Kolarova & Dimitr Dimitrov, The Roundtable Talks in Bulgaria, in
ROUNDTABLE TALKS, supra note 20, at 178, 190, 193. It should be noted that the
Roundtable in Bulgaria did provide for the subsequent election of a Constituent As-
sembly that undertook further constitutional revision without substantive restriction.
Id. at 201, 209-10.
192. See text at infra notes 198-211.
193. The short-lived transformation of the Finnish constitution (still under Rus-
sian suzerainty) in 1906 was effected by the unanimous assent of the four "orders" of
the Finnish Diet. SuKsi, supra note 96, at 80-81.
194. Thomas Paine, Constitutional Reform (1805), in THE THOmAS PAINE READER
525, 536 (Michael Foot & Isaac Kramnick eds., 1987).
195. See Section III(B) supra.
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thority produced them. Miguel Poiares Maduro makes the
comparison:
The first would be a constitutional political community,
where individuals are regarded as the dominant political
subjects and their interests are directly aggregated, with de-
liberation being based on the promotion of universal rules
guaranteed, ex ante, by its generality and abstraction and,
ex post, by non-discrimination. The second may be described
as an intergovernmental political community, where individ-
ual interests are aggregated through the states and
deliberation does not aim at universal rules based on the in-
dividual status of citizens but reflects the bargaining power
of states and generates accommodations among their per-
ceived conflicts of interest.196
In this description, it will be observed, the adjective "constitutional"
is reserved for the first kind of polity. In defending the 1787 Philadel-
phia Convention's decision to submit the proposed constitution to
specially elected state conventions instead of the state legislatures,
Alexander Hamilton had stressed the need for recourse to the sover-
eign people. The previous instrument of government, the Articles of
Confederation, was suspect exactly because it "never had a ratifica-
tion by the people" and, therefore, "rest[ed] on no better foundation
than the consent of the several legislatures." The difficulties that had
followed demonstrated "the necessity of laying the foundations of our
national government deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated
authority."' 97 The academic debate on a European Constitution has
rehearsed these concerns about constitution-making by intergovern-
mental agreement. Dieter Grimm, noting that this was the only
realistic possibility for a near-term European constitution, insisted
that such an arrangement could not be a "constitution in the full
sense of the term. The difference lies in the reference back to the will
of the Member States rather than to the people of the Union."198
196. Miguel Poiares Maduro, The Importance of Being Called a Constitution: Con-
stitutional Authority and the Authority of Constitutionalism, 3 I-CoN 332, 333 (2005).
See also Tierney, supra note 121, at 232 (describing a "plurinational state" resulting
from a "founding moment," a "union of pre-existing peoples subsequent to which sub-
state national societies within the state continue to develop as discrete demoi.").
197. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, 152 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).
198. Grimm, Need, supra note 135, at 291. In a subsequent article Grimm agreed
that a constitution may arise out of a treaty. Such a "founding treaty is, at the same
time, the final international treaty providing the legal basis of the new political en-
tity." Dieter Grimm, Integration by Constitution, 3 I-CoN 193, 207 (2005). The
proposed European Constitutional Treaty, however, did not qualify as a true constitu-
tion under this definition since all subsequent amendments were to be submitted to
the Member States for ratification. The evident success of supranational European
institutions might also be explained by factors other than a widely held perception of
some autonomous European constitutional authority. For a valuable recent discus-
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A particularly salient example of the ultimate constituent au-
thority of a negotiated agreement is the South African Constitution of
1997. That constitution was the final product of the settlement that
ended the apartheid regime after decades of internal resistance and
international pressure. Painful negotiations involving the govern-
ment, the African National Congress and various other interested
groups, in numerous formats, extended over several years. In Novem-
ber 1993, a group called the Multiparty Negotiating Forum agreed on
a long and detailed Interim Constitution that provided for non-racial
elections to a new Interim Parliament and the sharing of executive
power. 199 The Interim Parliament would also sit in joint session as a
Constituent Assembly and it was enjoined to adopt a new constitu-
tion within two years.200 The Constituent Assembly, however, would
not be the uncontrolled force we have associated with constituent au-
thority. It was obliged to draft the new constitution so as to conform
to thirty-four "Constitutional Principles." Before the new constitution
could be promulgated, moreover, it would have to be certified by the
Constitutional Court (also created by the Interim Constitution) as
consistent with those principles.201 The Parliament-Constituent As-
sembly was elected and conducted an elaborate campaign of public
education and consultation. 2 0 2 After two years, it produced a final
text and submitted it to the Constitutional Court which issued a
judgment of almost 300 pages, carefully parsing the new document
and interpreting the sometimes obscure Constitutional Principles.
The Court identified nine different aspects of the Constitution that
were out of compliance with ten different Constitutional Princi-
ples.2 0 3 Only after the Constituent Assembly made the necessary
amendments did the Court issue the necessary certification.2 0 4
The preamble to the resulting 1997 Constitution proclaims it to
be the act of "we the people of South Africa." The historical record,
however, contradicts this assertion. The members of the Constitu-
tional Assembly that drafted it and, eventually, declared it to be in
force, were elected but the Assembly's composition was carefully
planned to prevent it representing the people on a one person-one
vote basis. Four hundred of its five hundred members were elected
from constituencies with roughly equal populations. The other one
sion, see PETER L. LINDSETH, POWER AND LEGITIMACY: RECONCILING EUROPE AND THE
NATION-STATE (2010).
199. Interim Constitution of South Africa, 1993 ss. 40, 42, 48, 50, 84, 88.
200. Id. s. 73.
201. Id.
202. See Christina Murray, A Constitutional Beginning: Making South Africa's Fi-
nal Constitution, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 809 (2000-2001).
203. Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1996) 4
SA 744, para. 482 (CC).
204. Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, 1996 (1997) 2 SA 744 (CC).
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hundred, however, the members of the Senate, were chosen by the
political parties sitting in the various provincial legislatures on a pro-
portional basis and each province was awarded the same number of
senators. The influence of these members was enhanced by the In-
terim Constitution's requirement that, at least in the first instance, a
constitutional text had to be approved by a two-thirds majority.
It would be misleading, moreover, to describe the resulting con-
stitution even as an expression of the unfettered will of the
Constituent Assembly. The Assembly was constrained by the sub-
stantive limits incorporated in the Constitutional Principles
prescribed in the Interim Constitution. While many of those stan-
dards were the innocuous bread and butter of modern
constitutionalism, others dealt with specific and contestable issues.
"Diversity of language and culture" were to be promoted and "linguis-
tic, cultural and religious associations" protected.205 Indigenous law
and institutions including the "authority and status of a traditional
monarch" were to be preserved. A fairly carefully defined federal
structure was to be set up which had to include "national, provincial
and local levels." Trade unions and collective bargaining were to re-
ceive constitutional status. There was still ample room for the
Constituent Assembly to make important decisions but all of them
were reviewable by the Constitutional Court which would decide if
they were compatible with "a democratic system of government," pro-
tection of "fundamental rights" and "separation of powers."206 The
Interim Constitution's provisions on the Constitutional Principles
and its requirement of certification by the Constitutional Court were
themselves made unamendable. 207 In its certification judgment, the
Constitutional Court was candid about the necessary abridgment of
the right of the people to make any constitution it chose: "[the gov-
ernment and other minority groups were prepared to relinquish
power to the majority but were determined to have a hand in drawing
the framework for the future governance of the country."208 This was
not the constituent authority envisioned by Sieybs, effecting an "act
of will which is completely untrammeled by any procedure."209
205. Interim Constitution of South Africa, 1993, Schedule 4, Constitutional Princi-
ples XI, XII.
206. Interim Constitution of South Africa, 1993, Schedule 4, Constitutional Princi-
ples I, II, VI.
207. Interim Constitution of South Africa, 1993, s. 74.
208. Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1996) 4
SA 744, para. 12 (CC).
209. SIEYPs supra note 6, at 127. The model of constitution-making constrained by
pre-determined constitutional principles had already been employed, although, less
smoothly, in Portugal in 1974-1976 and played a role, as well, in the extended, vio-
lence-ridden process pursued in Angola beginning in 1992 and culminating in the
certification of a new constitution by the Constitutional Court in 2010. See Andre
Thomashaussen, Constituent Power and Legitimacy in the Political Evolution of
Southern Africa, 7-9 (2010) (manuscript on file with the author).
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In sum, the 1997 Constitution was very much the product of a
process defined and limited by the Interim Constitution. The Interim
Constitution, in its preamble announced that there was to be a new
constitution to be created by "representatives of all the people of
South Africa" but it would have to be made "in accordance with [the]
solemn pact recorded as Constitutional Principles."210 That solemn
pact and the prescribed method of constitution-making, were not
adopted by any kind of Constituent Assembly. They were the result of
a deal worked out in the Multiparty Negotiating Forum, an ad hoc
collection of representatives of numerous interests, none of whom
(certainly not the existing government) could claim to be speaking for
the people.211 The Interim Constitution had, indeed, been formally
enacted by the apartheid parliament under the provisions of the 1983
Constitution Act 2 1 2 but if ever there were a constitutional revision
that exceeded the plausible boundaries of mere amendment, this was
it. When we attempt, therefore, to trace our way back to the real cre-
ators of the South African Constitution, we end up in a back room
with fundamental decisions brokered by individuals answerable to
something quite different from a unitary people. It was only that dis-
tinctly non-popular process that was, to use Sieybs' expression,
"completely untrammeled."
When the authority of the South African Constitution is dis-
cussed today, however, this is not the locus of authority on which
people base its binding quality. After accurately describing the pro-
cess of its creation, the website of the South African government
concludes: "[t]his Constitution therefore represents the collective wis-
dom of the South African people and has been arrived at by general
agreement." In a judgment, actually referring to the Interim Consti-
tution, the Constitutional Court cited its preamble as indicating "the
general purpose for which the people ordained and established the
Constitution."213 These expressions might be dismissed as flourishes
meant to reconcile a historical fact with conventional political moral-
ity but, as we will see, this kind of transformation, is common and
discloses a critical aspect of constituent authority.
210. Interim Constitution of South Africa, 1993, Preamble.
211. On the Multi-Party Negotiating Process's "problems with legitimacy," see
DION A. BASSON, SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERIM CONSTITUTION: TEXT AND NoTEs xxi (1994).
Notwithstanding these facts, the Interim Constitution's preamble, like that of the fi-
nal Constitution, included the canonical declaration that it was enacted by "We the
people." Interim Constitution of South Africa 1993, Preamble.
212. R.S.A. Act 200 (1993) enacted under the authority of the South Africa Consti-
tution Act 110 of 1983 s.99.
213. Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another, [1996] (3) S.A. 850, para.157.
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IV. RECONSTRUCTING THE CONSTITUENT AUTHORITY
The multiple problems we have identified in connection with the
constituent authority of the people share a theme: constituent author-
ity depends on perception. The plausibility of one or another
specification of the constituent authority will always require consid-
eration of prevailing attitudes in the population of the jurisdiction in
which the constitution will operate. 214 It makes no sense, to speak of
any constituent authority-of the King or of the priests or of the rep-
resentatives of powerful communities, or of some particular
manifestation of the people-apart from the question of how people in
general view those actors, what they did and how they did it.
The force of any constitution depends on it continuing to be ac-
ceptable over time to the real human beings whose lives it affects.
That acceptance will have two aspects. First, some minimum part of
the relevant population must find the constitution's substantive rules
satisfactory, or at least tolerable. Second, that population must re-
gard the constitutional rules as having issued from a legitimate
source. It is this second requirement that engages the question of
constituent authority. Rules may be disliked but still effective if peo-
ple believe them to be the acts of an authority they accept as proper.
Of course, even the commands of the most revered authority will fi-
nally become ineffective if they impose intolerable burdens over an
extended period. In contrast, the reverse situation-substantively at-
tractive rules traceable to an illegitimate source-might sustain
itself for a long time. Most of the time, and for most people, there is
no occasion to think about constitutional rules at all, much less to
make a critical appraisal of the events that created them. A constitu-
tion, however, like any set of fixed rules, must eventually pinch some
people in unpleasant ways. 215 These pains and burdens of a given
constitutional regime will be easier or harder to take depending on
one's view of the authority of the constitutional rule maker. Moreo-
ver, constitutional provisions, like all legal rules, require
interpretation in doubtful cases. On such occasions, the interpreters
are likely to resort to speculation about the purposes for which those
214. See, for example, the idealized expression of this idea in a comment expres-
sing concern over the legitimacy of the South African Interim Constitution discussed
in the last section:
[Tihe resultant Constitution will be legitimate or acceptable to the people in
the state for the very reason that it was drawn up by the representatives of
the people in a democratic and unfettered fashion. The fact that the Consti-
tution gains acceptability and legitimacy to the extent that it can be said that
it lives in the hearts and minds of the people, ensures its longevity and con-
stitutional stability.
BAssoN, supra note 211, at 96.
215. It is a truism to state that the option of making a new constitution only
emerges when someone is unhappy with the existing one. On the occasions for critical
review of constitutional arrangements, see ELKINS ET AL., supra note 180, at 122-46.
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rules were created, returning us to the constitution-making events
and the nature of the constituent authority.
Sooner or later, that is, people will ask what it is about the crea-
tion of a constitution that obliges them to respect it. Perceptions of
the founding events, moreover, are liable to change over time. This
means that the existence of constituent authority in some person or
process can only be determined as of a given moment. To be sure,
some kind of regard or respect or fear must be present at the time a
constitution is created and put into effect. But for a constitution to
endure over decades or centuries, it will be necessary for that atti-
tude toward the constitution-makers to persist. The force of a
constitution that is created and established because of regard for its
religiously privileged authors will necessarily fade if the strength of
the religious convictions of the population diminishes. In this respect,
the existence of constituent authority, like the existence of a nation in
Ernest Renan's phrase, is a "daily plebiscite."216
Examples are provided by the fates of some of the original inde-
pendence constitutions of former British colonies. Like Antigua and
Barbuda, which has already been mentioned, these countries acceded
to independence under constitutions which had been agreed to by po-
litical forces in the relevant country but which were formally
promulgated in legislation of the United Kingdom. Over time, many
of these countries found it unacceptable to live under constitutions
created, even in form, by what was undoubtedly colonial legal author-
ity.2 1 7 When Trinidad and Tobago considered changing its
Westminster constitution in the 1970s, a government commission
commented that "[i]ndependence must involve indigenous symbols of
nationhood. Among young people in particular the British Sovereign
has no symbolic meaning." It was necessary to leave "behind the colo-
nial heritage of subjection, imitation and external dependence." 218
What sufficed as a constituent authority in 1962 had lost its force by
1976.
The experience of Trinidad and Tobago illustrates one natural
response to recognition that new attitudes and values make the con-
stituent authority that produced a given constitution unsustainable.
216. ERNEST RENAN, QU'EST-CE UNE NATION: WHAT IS A NATION? 49 (Wanda Romer
Taylor trans., 1997).
217. See WHEARE, supra note 97, at 89-113; Kay, Comparative, supra note 96, at
455-58 (discussing the Irish Constitution).
218. Quoted in William Dale, Making and Remaking of Commonwealth Constitu-
tions, 42 INT. & COMP. L.Q. 67, 69 (1993). Deploring the fact that many of the original
Caribbean Independence Constitutions had been left unchanged, Simeon C.R. McIn-
tosh has recently argued that "a country's processes for fundamental law making
[should] be so designed and conducted that outcomes will be continually apprehensi-
ble as products of 'collective deliberation' conducted rationally and fairly among free
and equal individuals." Simeon C.R. McIntosh, West Indian Constitutional Author-
ship 2, available at http://www.eccourts.org/jei doc/2008/booklaunch/WestIndian
ConstitutionalAuthorshipbySimeonMclntosh.pdf (quoting SeylaBenhabib).
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That is the explicit and overt substitution of a new constitution en-
acted in a new and politically more congenial procedure. 219 It is also
possible, however, to retain a constitutional text but to re-conceive
the events that created it. This kind of re-depiction may even occur in
the very process of enactment. We have already seen instances where
the actual political circumstances of a constitution's creation do not
jibe with the more agreeable political values proclaimed by the re-
sulting constitutional documents. The Japanese Constitution of 1947,
to cite another well-known example, was substantially determined by
the dictates of the occupying forces. Yet it declares itself to be the
work of "we the Japanese people." 220 Likewise, the preamble of the
carefully brokered 2004 constitution of Afghanistan states the au-
thority of "we the people of Afghanistan," though hedging that claim
with a concession that the people had to act "in accordance with the
historical, cultural and social realities as well as requirements of the
time."221
Constituent authority is not a fixed thing. It can be, and often is,
a shape-shifter, changing the way it is understood according to the
pressures of the moment. When, in the seventeenth century, the na-
ture of government in England became a matter of deadly
controversy, most of the supporters of parliamentary authority de-
clined to denounce the historical monarchical constitution. They
insisted, instead, that, under that constitution, the King and parlia-
ment each held critical and irreducible authority. That version of the
constitution was founded in a fantastic history in which the essential
role of the representatives of the people had existed from time imme-
morial.222 The invasion of William of Normandy in 1066 in this
narrative was no conquest but a trial by battle of a legal claim.2 2 3
219. In fact, the example of Trinidad and Tobago does not represent the thorough
recognition of a new constituent authority since the new constitution was adopted in
accordance with the amending procedure of the previous Independence Constitution
thus leaving a "relationship of validating purport." See text at supra notes 93-94. A
complete repudiation of the now unacceptable constituent authority requires that the
new constitution be created in a way that does not comport with the previous rules for
constitutional revision-that is by candid revolution.
220. Constitution of Japan, 1947, Preamble; John M. Maki, Japanese Constitu-
tional Style, in THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: ITS FEIST TwENTY YEARS 3-40 (Dan
Fenno Henderson ed., 1969).
221. Constitution of Afghanistan, 2004, Preamble.
222. See, e.g., JANELLE GREENBERG, THE RADICAL FACE OF THE ANCIENT CONSTITU-
TION: ST. EDWARD'S "LAws" IN EARLY MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (2001).
223. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAw 53
(1987). Blackstone held that William's title was based on conquest but also that he
took the crown subject to the law of England:
For, the victory obtained at Hastings not being a victory over the nation col-
lectively, but only over the person of Harold, the only right that the
conqueror could pretend to acquire thereby, was the right to possess the
crown of England, not to alter the nature of the government. And therefore,
as the English laws still remained in force, he must necessarily take the
crown subject to those laws, and with all its inherent properties ...
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Another example of the mutability of the constituent authority is
revealed in the dispute over the nature of the United States Constitu-
tion in the decades following its adoption in 1789. The proper
description of its creation was sharply contested throughout that pe-
riod. It was, depending on the point of view adopted, either the
constituent act of a single "people of the United States" or the product
of an agreement among the original states. The Constitution had
been ratified by special popularly elected conventions in each of the
states. By its terms, it became effective when nine states had ratified
it but only among the states that had approved it. Still, the Preamble
famously referred to the enactment by "we the people of the United
States," suggesting that this process replicated the will of some single
undivided people. The legitimacy of that authority in these circum-
stances was almost immediately attacked. In a pamphlet opposing
ratification in New York, published in February 1788, the writer
warned that by the terms of the Preamble, the Constitution was to be
"an agreement of the people of the United States as one great body
politic." 2 2 4 Replying to such arguments, James Madison insisted that
the mode of ratification was "to be given by the people, not as individ-
uals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and
independent states to which they respectively belong." It was not a
"national but a federal act."225
In an important case decided in 1819, the Supreme Court dealt
with the same question. In urging a narrow construction of federal
powers, one party argued that "the constitution was formed and
adopted not by the people of the United States at large but by the
people of the respective states." The other side asserted that "state
sovereignties are not the authors of the constitution." They were, in
fact, subordinated to the "national sovereignty . .. by the will of the
people." In his judgment, Chief Justice Marshall (who had partici-
pated in the ratification) categorically denied that the federal
government exercised only powers delegated by the states. Its power,
he stated "proceeds directly from the people." 226 Such judicial decla-
rations, however, failed to conclude the issue and the "compact
theory" of the constitution continued to divide the nation along sec-
WILLIAM BIACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *192-93 (1765).
224. Brutus, Essay XII (Feb. 7 and 14, 1788), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 298, 300 (R. Ketcham ed., 1986). See also
The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania
to Their Constituents (Dec. 18, 1787) in id. at 237, 246. (The Preamble is "the style of a
compact between individuals entering into a state of society and not that of a confed-
eration of states.")
225. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 at 243 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).
226. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 363, 377-78, 403-05 (1819).
2011] 759
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
tional lines until the matter was finally tested and decided by force of
arms in the American Civil War.2 2 7
A similar kind of transformation is observable in the cases dis-
cussed above concerning the nature of the authority of the 1873
Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention, in which the state Supreme
Court described the work of the Convention, an agency unauthorized
by the prior constitution, as the instrument of positive law.2 2 8 Some-
thing similar happened to the constitution of South Africa. Despite
the careful limits placed on the constitution-making process by the
original parties who wrote the Interim Constitution, it came to be
seen as an expression of the will of the undivided people of South
Africa. Visitors to the Constitutional Court can stop by the "We the
People Wall" and view the "We the People" photo exhibit. 229 The invo-
cation of the people to legitimize a constitution that is, in fact, the
product of an energized minority, or an agreement among several
such minorities, is made easier by the fact that the voice of the people,
for reasons discussed in the previous section, can never be equated
with the simple utterance of some person or group of persons. The
people is always an artifice with some more or less convincing tie to
the actual political wishes of some number of human beings at the
time of constitution-making. 230
'What is true of the people, moreover, is true of any constituent
authority. The capacity to understand the making of the constitution
in new ways suitable to the needs of a given time means that constit-
uent authority is not a fixed phenomenon. It may be an artifact not
only of the historical past but also of a past reconstructed to meet
current needs. What Wojciech Sadurski has said about constitutional
tradition is equally true of the more specific phenomenon of constitu-
ent authority. Ascertaining it "is always a matter of reconstruction (of
what we make of the past) for . . . 'the past is not univocal in complex
traditions." 231 In this respect, constituent authority is an attribute of
a constitutional system at a particular moment. Kelsen's idea of the
227. See Kay, Comparative, supra note 96, at 460-63. See also id. at 455-58 discuss-
ing litigation concerning the authority responsible for the legal quality of the Irish
Free State Constitution of 1922: the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council located
this authority in an act of the United Kingdom Parliament while the Supreme Court
of Ireland found it in the approval of the Irish Dail Eireann sitting as a constituent
assembly.
228. See text at supra notes 70-74.
229. See http://www.southafrica.info/aboutthistory/constitutionhill.htm.
230. Ulrich Preuss gives a benign characterization to this phenomenon when he
says " 'the people' or 'the nation' are not empirical entities; they are social constructs
which embody the aspirations, the ideals and the unity of the society and which are
purified from all traces of its more trivial and disuniting attributes . . . ." Ulrich K
Preuss, The Exercise of Constituent Power in Central and Eastern Europe, in THE
PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 8, at 211, 216. See generally Barshack,
supra note 120.
231. Wojciech Sadurski, European Constitutional Identity 5 (University of Sydney
Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 06/37), available at http://ssrn.com/
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basic norm as merely the necessary presupposition of a given legal
system is, in this way at least, valid.2 3 2
I need, however, to be clear. It does not follow from this that con-
stituent authority is a "pure abstraction,"233 merely a logical
inference from effective legal rules. Nor is it a fiction or a sham. It is,
as I stated at the outset, a fact. Since it is a fact that principally con-
cerns how people regard constituent events, however, it can and does
change over time. The very success of a constitution might influence
these critical perceptions, casting the events associated with its crea-
tion in a more favorable light. Thus we can conceive the curious
notion that, in part, and at least in some circumstances, it is the con-
stitution that makes the constituent authority and not the other way
around. In that strictly limited respect, there is a sense in which it
may be reasonable to characterize constituent authority as an
"imagined competence."234 But prevailing accounts of the founding of
a legal system cannot be perfectly fluid. When they change, they can
only change slowly, incrementally. 235 The success of a constitution
depends on the ability, at any given time, to posit a narrative about
its creation that is both politically acceptable and, if not historically
accurate, at least historically plausible. The materials available to
construct that narrative are malleable but they are not infinitely
malleable.236 The constituent authority may be many things but it is
not anything we want it to be.
abstract=939674) (quoting Martin Krygier, Thinking Like a Lawyer, in WOJCIECH
SADURSKI, ETHIcAL DIMENSIONS OF LEGAL THEORY 67, 68 (1991)).
232. See Hans Lindahl, Constituent Power and Reflexive Identity: Towards an On-
tology of Collective Selfhood, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 8, at
9, 21 ("A collective can only act by re-acting to what, preceding it at every step, never
ceases to confront it with the question 'Who are we?' Constituent power comes second
not first . .").
233. See Michelman, Authorship, supra note 2, at 93 (referring to "the people"). See
also Eleftheriadis, supra note 101, at 25 ("[T]he idea of a people is itself a legal
construction.").
234. KLEIN, supra note 10, at 192.
235. There are, however, cases where two plausible and developed versions of con-
stituent authority are in contest for an extended time and one or the other finally
prevails in a moment of revolution. This is what happened in Britain in 1688 and in
the United States in 1865.
236. For this reason, while I think Frank Michelman is right when he says that "it
will not be any fact of constitutional authorship to which we refer our legitimacy as-
sessments, but only currents of belief or narration about authorship," I do not think it
follows that those beliefs reduce to "our several appraisals of the rightness and fitness
of what we presently and severally observe as the evolved and evolving constitutional
practice of our country." Michelman, Reply, supra note 175, at 730.
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